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Questions the IRS Will Not Answer
EMILY CAUBLE*
When a taxpayer plans to undertake a transaction and its tax consequences are
unclear, the taxpayer can request a letter ruling from the IRS. The IRS issues
numerous letter rulings each year. In 2020, for instance, the IRS issued 777 letter
rulings. The IRS refrains from issuing letter rulings on certain topics. At the
beginning of each year, the IRS publishes an updated list of the topics on which it
will not rule. Many of the topics on which it will not rule arise in areas of tax law
governed by standards where the tax outcome depends heavily on each transaction’s
specific facts. This pattern is consistent with the IRS’s stated position that it
ordinarily does not rule in certain areas because of the factual nature of the matter
involved.
This Article suggests that a policy against ruling on fact-specific topics sacrifices
an opportunity to rule on many of the very topics for which a letter ruling could be
particularly useful. Because the fact-specific nature of a topic makes it ill-suited for
generally applicable guidance, such a topic is a particularly good candidate for a
letter ruling.
Existing literature contains very little examination of the reasons for the IRS’s
policy against ruling on fact-specific topics. This Article begins to fill that gap and
suggests eight potential concerns that might underlie the IRS’s reticence. This Article
analyzes whether each concern could be addressed by means other than simply not
issuing rulings. To gauge the validity of some of the concerns, this Article examines
letter rulings that the IRS did, in fact, issue on several fact-specific topics prior to
adding them to the no ruling list. The previously issued letter rulings illustrate that
many of the concerns do not inevitably arise in the case of all letter rulings on factspecific topics. Some of the previously issued letter rulings also demonstrate steps
that the IRS should take, or avoid, in order to mitigate some of the concerns if it does
rule on fact-specific topics.
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INTRODUCTION
A vast body of federal income tax law is contained in statutes, regulations, judicial
opinions, and IRS guidance. Notwithstanding (and in some cases because of) the
volume and intricate nature of enacted tax law, a ready answer does not exist
regarding the tax treatment of numerous transactions and events. This residual
uncertainty in tax law stems from several causes.1 Some transactions and events occur

1. See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Advance Tax Rulings, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 144 (2009) (“Tax law, like many other areas of
the law, is indeterminate in many cases.”); Jeffrey H. Kahn, Hedging the IRS—A Policy
Justification for Excluding Liability and Insurance Proceeds, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2–3
(2009); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1017, 1032–34 (2009) (describing judicial anti-abuse doctrines as a source of uncertainty
in tax law and stating that “[m]ore important for our purposes than the details of these
doctrines, though, is that the doctrines are standards, not rules”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 363 (2005) (“Although the
tax system is primarily a system of rules, it is inevitably a system of standards as well, as some
scholars have recently begun to emphasize. This is because, even in a system with highly
complex rules—in fact, perhaps especially in such a system—there can be difficult questions
of how the rules are to be applied to complex transactions.”); Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against
Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489, 494 (2011) (“As is well known to tax
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that simply were not contemplated by lawmakers. In some cases, the novelty of an
event or transaction occurs naturally. In other cases, it is manufactured by
sophisticated taxpayers designing transactions with the aim of obtaining tax treatment
more beneficial than lawmakers intended. Uncertainty in tax law also arises because
some areas of tax law are governed by standards. In these areas, the tax outcome in
any given case depends on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. As a
result, unless existing guidance describes the tax treatment of precisely the same
transaction, a transaction’s tax outcome will not be entirely free from doubt.
One tool available to a taxpayer who plans to engage in a transaction with
uncertain tax consequences and who desires more certainty regarding its tax outcome
is to seek a letter ruling from the IRS.2 To seek a ruling, the taxpayer must submit a
ruling request that describes all of the relevant facts, the questions on which the
taxpayer seeks a ruling, relevant legal authority, and how the authority applies to the
taxpayer’s facts.3 In addition, the taxpayer must pay a filing fee.4 Once the IRS issues
a ruling, the taxpayer to whom it is issued generally can rely upon it if the taxpayer
carries out the transaction consistent with the facts described in the ruling request.
This is the case because the Treasury Regulations provide that a letter ruling will
generally not be revoked retroactively as long as the ruling request completely and
accurately disclosed relevant facts, the subsequently developed facts were not
materially different from the facts on which the ruling was based, there has been no
change in law, the ruling was issued with respect to a transaction the taxpayer
planned to undertake, and the taxpayer relied upon the ruling in good faith such that
retroactive revocation of the ruling would harm the taxpayer.5 As a result, obtaining
a letter ruling affords certainty to the taxpayer. However, if the IRS later discovers
that the taxpayer did not accurately and completely disclose relevant facts when
requesting the ruling, the IRS can revoke the ruling retroactively.6 Only the taxpayer
to whom a ruling is issued can rely upon it.7 That said, the publication of issued letter
rulings in anonymized form provides a guide to taxpayers who plan to engage in
similar transactions regarding the IRS’s likely position on such transactions.8
The IRS will not issue letter rulings on certain topics. At the beginning of each
year, the IRS issues a revenue procedure containing the most up-to-date list of topics

experts but perhaps much less well known to nontax experts, taxpayers with more complicated
tax profiles regularly have to deal with tax law uncertainty. . . . There are a number of sources
of tax law uncertainty. Prevalent use of standards in the tax law may leave taxpayers unsure
of the application of a standard to a particular set of facts.”).
2. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is a written
determination issued to a taxpayer by an Associate office in response to the taxpayer’s written
inquiry, filed prior to the filing of returns or reports that are required by the tax laws, about its
status for tax purposes or the tax effects of its acts or transactions.”).
3. Id. at § 7 (setting forth general instructions for requesting letter rulings).
4. Id. at App. A (listing the user fees for various types of letter ruling requests).
5. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5) (1967).
6. Id. at § 601.201(l)(5)(i).
7. See id. at § 601.201(l)(1) (“A taxpayer may not rely on an advance ruling issued to
another taxpayer.”).
8. See, e.g., Rachelle Y. Holmes, Forcing Cooperation: A Strategy for Improving Tax
Compliance, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1427 (2011) (noting that the publication of letter rulings
in redacted form provides “helpful guidance” to other taxpayers).
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on which it will not rule,9 and if the IRS decides to modify the list before the
beginning of the next year, it will issue a revenue procedure providing any updates.10
The revenue procedures describe some no ruling topics in general terms—for
instance, the IRS will not issue letter rulings on “questions that the Service
determines, in its discretion, should not be answered in the general interests of sound
tax administration, including due to resource constraints.”11 The revenue procedures
also contain lists of specific topics on which the IRS will not issue letter rulings, as
well as lists of specific topics on which the IRS “ordinarily” will not issue letter
rulings.12 The most recent revenue procedure lists a total of 141 particular topics on
which the IRS will not issue letter rulings and 63 particular topics on which the IRS
ordinarily will not issue letter rulings.13
Many of the topics on which the IRS will not rule or will not ordinarily rule
occupy areas of tax law that are governed by facts and circumstances tests or, in other
words, areas of tax law governed by standards. As the IRS has stated in the revenue
procedure that provides guidance on how to seek a letter ruling, “[t]he Service
ordinarily does not issue letter rulings . . . in certain areas because of the factual
nature of the matter involved or for other reasons.”14 Examples of topics on the
current list that fall in this category are numerous and include:15 (1) whether a transfer
is a gift for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 102(a); (2) whether a capital
expenditure for an item that is ordinarily used for personal, living, or family
purposes, such as a swimming pool, has as its primary purpose the medical care of
the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent, or is related directly to such
medical care for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 213; and (3) whether an

9. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, § 3.
10. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 82-65, 1982-2 C.B. 852.
11. See Rev. Proc 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, § 3.02(10).
12. See id. at §§ 3.01, 4.01.
13. Id.
14. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 6.02; see also Treas. Reg. § 601.201(s)(2).
Similar language also used to be included in the annual revenue procedure containing the no
ruling list. It can be found in that revenue procedure as early as 1960 and as recently as 2020.
See Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 C.B. 880, § 2; Rev. Proc. 2020-3, 2020-1 I.R.B. 131, § 2.01
(“There are, however, certain areas in which, because of the inherently factual nature of the
problems involved, or for other reasons, the Service will not issue rulings . . . .”) Curiously,
this specific language was omitted from the 2021 revenue procedure that contains the no ruling
list. See Rev. Proc. 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, § 2.01 (“There are, however, certain areas in
which the Service will not issue rulings . . . .”). However, the language persists in the 2021
revenue procedure that provides guidance on how to seek a ruling. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1,
2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 6.02. Also, the list of topics on which the IRS will not rule remains largely
unchanged from 2020 to 2021. See Rev. Proc. 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, § 1.02 (cataloguing
changes).
15. This Article focuses on examples that represent a small subset of the fact-specific
topics on which the IRS will not rule. When narrowing the universe of potential examples to
a more manageable size, this Article aims to omit certain topics that tend to only affect
taxpayers with sufficient resources to obtain certainty in other ways. See infra Part III.h. While
the examples that this Article does discuss will affect such taxpayers, they will not exclusively
affect such taxpayers. Also, the examples are selected with the goal in mind of illustrating the
range of potential concerns discussed in Part III.
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exchange described in Internal Revenue Code Section 1031(f) involving related
parties, or a subsequent disposition of property involved in the exchange, has as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax, or whether an exchange
is part of a transaction (or series of transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of
Section 1031(f).16 The most recent revenue procedure containing the no ruling list
provides that the IRS will not rule on either of the first or second of these topics and,
as to the third topic, the IRS ordinarily will not rule subject to some specified
exceptions.17
The IRS added each of these three topics after publishing the first no ruling list.
In particular, the first topic—involving gifts—was added in 2008.18 The second
topic—related to whether certain expenditures are for the primary purpose of medical
care or directly related to medical care—was added in 1982.19 The third topic—
entailing Section 1031(f)—was added in 2014.20 Prior to adding each of these topics,
the IRS did, in fact, issue quite a number of letter rulings on each of the first two
topics.21 In 2014, the third topic was added to the list of topics on which the IRS
ordinarily will not rule subject to two specified exceptions. Most of the rulings on
this topic issued before 2014 involve fact patterns that are described by those
specified exceptions, but a small number of rulings issued before 2014 fall outside
of the specified exceptions.22
Aside from making the general observation that the IRS refrains from ruling on
some topics because of their fact-specific nature, existing literature contains very
little examination of the reasons for the IRS’s policy against ruling on fact-specific
topics.23 This Article begins to fill that gap by offering eight possible rationales for
the IRS’s reluctance to rule on these topics and analyzing each of the possible
rationales. Assessing these potential rationales is a useful exercise because it reveals
that most or all of the goals served by not ruling on fact-specific topics could be

16. See Rev. Proc. 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, §§ 3.01(19), 3.01(43), 4.01(46).
17. Id.
18. See Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-3 I.R.B. 110, § 1.02(1) (“New section 3.01(9) (Section
102—Gifts and Inheritances) has been added.”)
19. Rev. Proc. 82-65, 1982-2 C.B. 852 (amending Rev. Proc. 82-22 to add this item to the
list of issues on which the IRS will not issue letter rulings).
20. Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-3 I.R.B. 111, § 1.02(11) (“Section 4.01(43), regarding §
1031(f), has been added.”).
21. See infra Parts I.A. and I.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. For one note that does offer some explanations for this policy, see Stephen M.
Goodman, Note, The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 81, 86 (1964) (“For purposes of analysis, there are three basic
categories into which this list can be divided: 1) where the matter is ‘inherently factual’; 2)
where the Commissioner’s position is unsettled; 3) where the Commissioner’s concept of
‘sound tax administration’ dictates that he not rule.”). This note went on to group fact-specific
questions into different categories and offered some explanation for not issuing rulings in those
categories. Id. at 87–89. For one other article that does offer one explanation for the IRS’s
refusal to rule on fact-specific topics, see Logue, supra note 1 at 409–10 (“One conceivable
answer is that the Service . . . [does] . . . not have a large enough or sufficiently capable staff
to do the factual and legal analysis necessary to issue rulings on such fact-intensive questions
without running a big risk of adverse selection and moral hazard.”).
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equally well served or better served by taking steps other than simply not issuing
rulings.
Moreover, taking steps other than simply not issuing rulings to address the
concerns undergirding the IRS’s reluctance to rule on fact-specific questions could
allow the IRS to issue letter rulings on questions for which a letter ruling could be
particularly useful. Letter rulings are designed to address questions not readily
answered by statutes, regulations, cases, and other sources of legal authority. Indeed,
the IRS generally will not issue rulings on questions that are already adequately
addressed by these other sources.24 Fact-specific questions will often fall in the
category of questions for which a ready answer is not already available. Given that
the answer to a fact-specific question, by definition, turns on the facts of a particular
case, generally applicable authority, often, will not provide a definitive answer
regarding the tax treatment of a particular transaction. Unless the facts of a taxpayer’s
transaction exactly match the facts of a transaction described in existing guidance,
the question of how the taxpayer’s transaction will be treated cannot be answered,
with complete certainty, based upon existing authority. Thus, a fact-specific question
is one type of question for which a ruling could be particularly useful to a taxpayer.
This Article considers eight potential rationales for the IRS’s refusal to rule on
fact-specific questions. First, issuing a ruling on a fact-specific question could be
very time consuming because the IRS needs to obtain and consider all the relevant
facts of the transaction. Given the IRS’s resource constraints, engaging in a timeconsuming factual analysis might not be the best use of the IRS’s time. Second, it is
possible that the risk that taxpayers will fabricate or exaggerate certain facts is
heightened when taxpayers are providing information necessary for a fact-specific
inquiry, and, therefore, the IRS hesitates to rule on these topics to avoid being duped
into issuing an unduly favorable ruling. Third, in some circumstances, the taxpayer
will not be the person best positioned to provide the IRS with all of the facts relevant
to a fact-specific inquiry.
Fourth, similar to the notion that the fact-finder at the trial level is better
positioned to determine facts while appellate court judges are better positioned to
determine law, the IRS’s refusal to rule on fact-specific questions may be driven by
the view that, as between individuals at the IRS’s national office who issue rulings
and local auditing agents, the former have a comparative advantage when it comes
to making judgments of law while the latter have a comparative advantage when it
comes to finding facts. Fifth, a letter ruling on a fact-specific question might be of
little use to anyone other than the taxpayer to whom it is issued. Technically, no letter
rulings can be relied upon by other taxpayers, but they nevertheless can provide other
taxpayers with useful information about the IRS’s likely views on the tax treatment
of similar transactions. However, a letter ruling on a fact-specific question may be
less suitable for this purpose than letter rulings on other topics because a letter ruling
on a fact-specific topic may offer little insight into how the IRS would likely rule in
the case of a different transaction.
Sixth, particularly when the fact-specific question entails determining whether a
transaction was overly tax-motivated (as is true in the case of the topics related to
Section 1031(f) on which the IRS ordinarily will not issue letter rulings), the IRS’s

24. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 6.11.
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hesitation might be driven, in part, by a concern that providing too much certainty
regarding an anti-abuse provision’s contours will allow taxpayers to disguise their
overly tax-motivated transactions as not so motivated. Seventh, the IRS might be
concerned that the publication of letter rulings issued on fact-specific topics will
cause the public to perceive inconsistencies among the conclusions reached in rulings
with similar but slightly different facts, and this concern might prompt the IRS to
refrain from issuing rulings on such topics altogether. Eighth, and finally, the
hesitation to rule might be based on the notion that we ought to use alternative means
to provide taxpayers with certainty.
With respect to each of these concerns, this Article will analyze whether the
concern is valid and whether the concern could be addressed by means other than
simply not issuing rulings. To gauge the validity of some of these concerns, this
Article examines letter rulings that the IRS did, in fact, issue on several fact-specific
topics prior to adding them to the list of topics on which the IRS will not (or
ordinarily will not) rule. With respect to many of the concerns, the previously issued
letter rulings illustrate that the concern does not inevitably arise in the case of all
letter rulings on the topic so that it may not justify a blanket policy against ruling on
that topic. Some of the previously issued letter rulings also demonstrate steps that the
IRS should take, or avoid, to mitigate some of the concerns if it does rule on factspecific topics.
Two additional notes about the scope and aim of this Article are in order. First,
some topics are included on the no ruling list for reasons other than their fact-based
nature. For instance, the IRS may include on the no ruling list topics on which it has
not yet developed a position.25 This Article does not address all reasons for including
topics on the list and focuses solely on the notion that the fact-specific nature of a
topic results in its inclusion on the list. Second, it is difficult to conclude with
certainty that the reason for including any particular topic on the no ruling list is only
that it is a fact-specific topic because typically topics are added to the list without
much explanation by the IRS. For that reason, it is possible that some of the particular
examples that this Article uses for purposes of illustration did not make their way
onto the no ruling list only because they involve fact-specific inquiries. Instead, the
IRS may have decided that issuing guidance on the topic does not warrant use of
administrative resources for reasons unrelated to its fact-specific nature. If this is true
for any given topic, the analysis in this Article does not necessarily suggest that the
topic ought not be on the no ruling list. However, while it is difficult to determine
whether the fact-specific nature of an inquiry was the driving force behind including
any particular topic on the list, it is clear, based on the language of numerous revenue
procedures,26 that the IRS views the fact-specific nature of a tax determination as a
factor that weighs in favor of not ruling on the topic. The aim of this Article is to
question whether a topic’s fact-specific nature justifies not ruling on the topic and to
suggest that, if the fact-specific nature of a topic is the only or primary reason for
including it on the no ruling list, the topic may not belong on that list.

25. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 23, at 90 (describing this as a reason for why the IRS
will refuse to issue letter rulings in some circumstances).
26. See sources cited supra note 14.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides examples of fact-specific topics
on which the IRS will not (or ordinarily will not) rule. Part II explains why letter
rulings on fact-specific topics could be particularly useful. Part III examines each of
the eight potential rationales for the IRS’s hesitation to rule and makes
recommendations for better ways to address some of these concerns. To undertake
the analysis in Part III, this Article draws upon previously issued letter rulings on
fact-specific topics to determine what lessons can be gleaned from those previously
issued rulings. Even though some of these topics might be on the no ruling list for
other reasons as noted above, they are fact-specific topics, and, as a result, an
examination of rulings that were issued on these topics can be used to gauge the
validity of some of the concerns about ruling on fact-specific topics generally.
I. FACT-SPECIFIC NO RULING TOPICS
When a taxpayer plans to undertake a transaction and its tax consequences are
unclear, the taxpayer can request a letter ruling from the IRS. The IRS issues
numerous letter rulings each year. In 2020, for instance, the IRS issued 777 letter
rulings.27 At the beginning of each year, the IRS publishes a revenue procedure
containing a list of topics on which the IRS will not issue letter rulings as well as a
list of topics on which the IRS ordinarily will not issue letter rulings. Many of the
topics involve fact-specific determinations. This Part will proceed by discussing
three examples.
A. Gift Determination
When a taxpayer receives property as a gift, the taxpayer can exclude the value of
the property from income.28 In Commissioner v. Duberstein, the Supreme Court
concluded that whether a transfer is a gift turns on the transferor’s intention, and the
requisite intention is “detached and disinterested generosity.”29 When litigating the
Duberstein case, the IRS advocated for the adoption of clearer tests.30 The court
rejected the IRS’s approach, stating, “We are of opinion that the governing principles
are necessarily general . . . and that the problem is one which, under the present
statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive statement that would
produce a talisman for the solution of concrete cases.”31
When determining whether any given transfer is a gift, courts have examined
various objective indicia of the transferor’s intent. As one such objective factor,
courts have taken into account statements made by the transferor close to the time of
the transfer. In Runyon v. Commissioner, for instance, the court concluded that
payments made by two individuals to another individual were gifts, and the court

27. This number is based on a Westlaw search for all private letter rulings from 2020.
28. See I.R.C. § 102(a).
29. 363 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1960).
30. In particular, the IRS argued that “gifts should be defined as transfers of property
made for personal as distinguished from business reasons.” Id. at 284 n.6.
31. Id. at 284–85.
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appeared to have been influenced by the fact that one of the transferors stated to the
transferee at the time of transfer that the payments were gifts.32
The relationship between the transferor and transferee is also a relevant factor. In
Mesinger v. Commissioner, for example, the court treated the rent-free use of an
apartment as a gift where the transferor and transferee had a close family friendship.33
Courts have also considered the transferor’s tax treatment of the transfer as
potential evidence of the transferor’s intent. As one illustration, in O’Connor v.
Commissioner, the court concluded that the payor’s issuance to the payee of a Form
1099-MISC that reported the payment as taxable income demonstrated that the payor
did not intend the payment to be a gift.34 As another example, in Duberstein, the
court stated that the fact that the transferor takes a business deduction for the cost of
a transfer is relevant, although not determinative.35
Also pertinent to the determination of whether a transfer constitutes a gift is
whether the transferor has received or has an expectation of receiving an economic
benefit from the transferee. In Hornung v. Commissioner, for instance, the court
concluded that the free use of a car provided to a professional football player by a
car dealership was not a gift because the dealership likely believed that use of the car
would act as a celebrity endorsement.36 Also, in Duberstein, the Supreme Court held
that the Tax Court’s determination that the transfer of a Cadillac was not a gift was
not clearly erroneous because the transferee had provided business referrals to the
transferor in the past and the transferor may have hoped to induce additional referrals
in the future.37
Another factor at play is whether the transferee has already been adequately
compensated for any economic benefit provided to the transferor. Thus, for instance,
in Runyon, the court concluded that payments made by two individuals to another
individual were gifts, and the court took note of the fact that the transferee had
already been adequately compensated for services she provided in the past to a
corporation owned, indirectly, by the transferors.38
In summary, a multitude of factors may influence an assessment of whether a
transferor possesses the requisite state of mind for a transfer to constitute a gift. Thus,
the determination of whether a transfer is a gift is generally governed by a facts and
circumstances test.
In 2008 the topic of whether something constitutes a gift for income tax purposes
was added to the list of topics on which the IRS would not issue letter rulings.39
Before that time, the IRS issued various letter rulings on this topic. Some of the
rulings provided taxpayers with their hoped-for answers that transfers did constitute
gifts. For example, in a 1958 letter ruling, the taxpayer was a pastor at a church, and
the church regularly paid him a salary.40 At a church meeting, the members passed a

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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motion authorizing the church to give funds to the pastor and his wife upon his
retirement.41 The IRS concluded that the amounts could be treated as gifts for income
tax purposes.42
As a second example, in a 1970 letter ruling, the IRS concluded that payments
received while panhandling could be treated as gifts for income tax purposes.43 The
ruling assumed facts that were not directly supplied by the taxpayer stating, “The
information you furnished did not indicate precisely what you mean by
‘panhandling.’ However, we have assumed that you refer to a person who . . . does
not perform any services or sell a product in the course of his ‘panhandling’
activities.”44 The ruling concluded, “[I]f passersby contribute to you out of purely
charitable motives, or from a disinterested generosity or similar impulse it would be
proper to regard such amounts as gifts.”45
Several other previously issued letter rulings also determined that transfers are
gifts. For instance, a 1954 letter ruling concluded that an award given to a taxpayer
for creative television work which was funded by contributions from 8,000
individuals constituted a gift.46 A 1957 letter ruling characterized as gifts the
payments made by a city to the widow of a former employee.47 A letter ruling issued
in 1959 treated as gifts payments to a widow of a Supreme Court Justice made
pursuant to a law passed by Congress after the death of the Justice.48 In 1959, the
IRS ruled that an award provided by the United States to the widow of a deceased
university employee in recognition of scientific contributions constituted a gift.49 A
1977 letter ruling determined that a transfer of stock to a trust for the benefit of the
taxpayer’s wife and children was a gift.50 The transferor was the brother of the
taxpayer’s wife, but the taxpayer was also an employee and officer of a company
where the transferor was a director and officer.51 The ruling concluded that the
transfer was a gift and stated that the IRS’s conclusion was based on the assumption
that the decision to transfer the stock was “intended solely as an expression of [the
transferor’s] affection, respect, and admiration for [his sister and the taxpayer’s
family] and not as compensation to [the taxpayer] for past, present, or future
services.”52 The IRS reached the same conclusion in a series of other rulings issued
close in time with similar facts that appear to have been requested by the relatives of
the taxpayer who requested the 1977 ruling just described.53

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7004070460A (Apr. 7, 1970).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5401064520A (Jan. 6, 1954).
47. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5705294700A (May 29, 1957).
48. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5907085170A (July 8, 1959).
49. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5906195290A (June 19, 1959).
50. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7733026 (May 17, 1977).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7733058 (May 19, 1977); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7733059
(May 19, 1977); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7733060 (May 19, 1977); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7733061
(May 19, 1977).
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In addition to issuing rulings concluding that various transfers did constitute gifts,
the IRS has also issued letter rulings concluding that various transfers did not
constitute gifts. For example, in a 1957 letter ruling, the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s
family were selected as part of a nationwide search to find an “average American
family” from each state and asked to attend an event that involved televised
interviews.54 As a result of being selected, the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s family
were given a week-long trip, a complete set of jewelry and accessories, and a
wardrobe. The ruling concluded that the items were not gifts but rather prizes and
had to be included in income.55
As a second example, in a 1984 letter ruling, an assistant professor at a large
university received a monetary award that was sponsored by various private
companies.56 The awards were given to junior faculty members who had
demonstrated abilities in research and teaching.57 The university selected recipients
and determined the amount of each award.58 Enough money was available to give
awards to every untenured faculty member.59 The ruling concluded that the award
received by the taxpayer was not a gift and had to be included in income.60
A third example can be found in a letter ruling issued in 1986.61 In that ruling, A
and B met in 1947 when they worked for the same employer, and they had
maintained their friendship after A’s retirement in 1963.62 In 1981, A was
hospitalized and required ongoing in-home care. A asked B to live with her.63 B was
expected to return home from work by seven or eight in the evening on weekdays
and to spend the majority of her free time with A on weekends.64 A executed a trust
providing that if B was living in the house when A died, the house would be deeded
to B.65 If the living arrangement ended prior to A’s death, then, in lieu of the house,
B would receive $1000 per month for every month B had lived with A.66 When A
died, B still lived with A, and as a result, B received the house.67 The ruling
concluded that the house was not a gift for income tax purposes but, instead, was
compensation for services.68
Some other previously issued letter rulings concluded that various transfers did
not constitute gifts. For instance, a letter ruling issued in 1955 determined that strike
benefits paid from a fund that was financed with union members’ contributions were

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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not gifts.69 In 1958, the IRS issued a letter ruling noting that annual payments made
to a former United States president, pursuant to a law passed by Congress, were not
gifts.70 A 1963 letter ruling concluded that a $100,000 payment made to an
individual’s estate by the U.S. government was not a gift where the payment was in
full satisfaction of any claims the estate might have against the government based
upon an invention by the individual.71 Several letter rulings issued in 1964 and 1965
determined that annual distributions that a taxpayer received from a Christmas fund
were not gifts where it appeared that employees expected their salaries to be
supplemented by annual distributions from the fund.72 A 1976 letter ruling decided
that awards based on the length of active service granted to volunteer firemen were
not gifts.73 Two letter rulings issued in 1981 and 1983 considered payments made by
a state or local government to residents to encourage them to remain residents,
finding that they were not gifts.74 In 1985, the IRS ruled that cash awards for referring
new clients to a bank’s trust department based upon the business generated by the
referrals were not gifts.75 As a final example, a 1987 letter ruling concluded that early
retirement payments received by an employee upon an employee’s retirement did not
constitute gifts.76
In at least one instance, prior to adding the topic of whether a transfer constitutes
a gift to the list of specific items on which the IRS will not rule, the IRS issued a
ruling that declined to reach a conclusion regarding whether a transfer was a gift by
pointing to the fact-specific nature of that inquiry.77 In particular, in a 1985 letter
ruling, a tax-exempt organization provided vocational development services to
persons with disabilities.78 Some of the organization’s clients participated in a
program in which they were not expected to produce sellable products and were paid
$1.50 weekly.79 The payments did not relate to work performed but were intended to
help the clients become accustomed to the program.80 The ruling stated, “While it
appears that the payments . . . may be gifts and excludable from the gross income of
the clients, we are unable to rule on the issue. . . . [T]he Service will not ordinarily
rule with respect to any matter in which the determination requested is primarily one
of fact.”81

69. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5508125320A (Aug. 12, 1955).
70. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5812015510A (Dec. 1, 1958).
71. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6304104830A (Apr. 10, 1963).
72. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6404241760A (Apr. 24, 1964); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
6404245530A (Apr. 24, 1964); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6503015530A (Mar. 1, 1965).
73. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7609230400A (Sep. 23, 1976).
74. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121122 (Feb. 27, 1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8317090 (Jan.
27, 1983).
75. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8520014 (Feb. 11, 1985).
76. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8737037 (June 15, 1987).
77. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8528017 (Apr. 11, 1985).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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B. Medically-Related Capital Expenditures
Just as the determination of whether something is a gift for income tax purposes
turns on a fact-specific inquiry, so too does the determination of whether something
is a deductible medical expense.82 An individual taxpayer is entitled to a deduction
for certain medical expenses.83 The deduction can only be claimed by individuals
who itemize deductions rather than claim the standard deduction.84 In addition, the
deduction is only allowed for medical expenses to the extent that they exceed 7.5%
of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.85 Subject to those limitations, the deduction
is granted for expenses “not compensated for by insurance or otherwise for ‘medical
care’ of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or the taxpayer’s dependent.”86
Determining whether something constitutes “medical care” often entails an
examination of the particular facts of any given case. The Internal Revenue Code
defines “medical care” to include, among other items, amounts paid “for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body.”87 In addition to providing other
guidance, the Treasury Regulations provide, “[A]n expenditure which is merely
beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a
vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care.”88
From time to time, courts have had to grapple with whether an expense that would
typically be a nondeductible personal expense—such as an expense incurred for
something that is typically merely beneficial to an individual’s general health—can
qualify as an expense incurred for medical care. As Professor Pratt has noted, “Much
of the case law under § 213 involves taxpayers trying to deduct as a medical expense
the cost of an item, such as a pool or a vacation, which is usually purchased for
nonmedical personal reasons.”89
In Havey v. Commissioner,90 for instance, the taxpayer’s spouse suffered from a
serious heart condition, and her cardiologist advised that she take a trip to the
seashore during the summer months to benefit from the humid weather and take a
trip to Arizona during the winter.91 The taxpayer deducted the costs of the trips, and
the Tax Court held that they did not qualify as deductible medical expenses.92 As the

82. For discussion of the determination of whether something qualifies as a deductible
medical expense, see, for example, Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs
of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1139–44 (2004).
83. I.R.C. § 213.
84. See I.R.C. §§ 63(b) (not including the deduction for medical expenses in the list of
deductions from adjusted gross income that are allowed if an individual does not elect to
itemize), 63(d) (defining itemized deductions as deductions other than those allowed in
arriving at adjusted gross income and other than those listed in Section 63(b)).
85. I.R.C. § 213(a).
86. Id.
87. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1960).
89. Pratt, supra note 82 at 1141.
90. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
91. Id. at 409–10.
92. Id. at 411–13.
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court stated, “[M]any expenses, such as the cost of vacations, though undoubtedly
highly and directly beneficial to the general health . . . are not deductible because
they fall within the category of personal or living expenses.”93 The court listed
several factors that ought to be considered when determining whether an expense
qualifies as a medical expense including (1) the taxpayer’s motive or purpose for
incurring the expense, (2) whether the expense was incurred at the direction or
suggestion of a physician, (3) whether the treatment bears directly on the physical
condition in question, (4) whether it would be reasonable to believe that the treatment
would be effective, and (5) whether the treatment is undertaken close in time to the
onset or recurrence of the disease or condition.94 Under the facts of Havey, the court
was not convinced that the expenses constituted medical expenses for several
reasons, including that a change in climate was not the generally accepted treatment
for the taxpayer’s wife’s specific condition, that the trips occurred sometime after
the onset of the medical condition, that the taxpayer and his wife had taken similar
trips for vacation purposes in previous years, and that the taxpayer’s wife did not
seek any medical services during the trips.95
Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, cases with somewhat similar facts
have come out differently.96 In Watkins v. Commissioner,97 the taxpayers, a husband
and wife, claimed a medical expense deduction for the costs of trips taken to
Florida.98 The husband’s physician and wife’s physician had each prescribed the trips
because natural sunlight treatments would mitigate the condition from which each
was suffering.99 The court concluded that the expenses were for medical care.100 The
court reached this conclusion based upon its observations that the medical conditions
existed immediately before the taxpayers went to Florida, the taxpayers’ physicians
prescribed the trips, and the beneficial effect of the Florida climate was related to the
taxpayers’ specific conditions and “apart from the general benefit to health which
any vacationer or visitor would receive from being out of doors in the sun.”101
The Treasury Regulations contain special rules regarding whether and to what
extent a capital expenditure is deductible as a medical expense.102 Amounts paid that
permanently improve or increase the value of property generally constitute capital

93. Id. at 411–12.
94. Id. at 412.
95. Id. at 412–13.
96. Courts have addressed whether expenses incurred for items that would typically be
personal expenses can constitute medical expenses in numerous other cases. For just a few
more, see, for example, Ring v. Comm’r, 23 T.C. 950 (1955) (holding that a trip to the Shrine
of Our Lady of Lourdes to seek spiritual aid and take mineral baths did not constitute medical
care); Ochs v. Comm’r, 195 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1952) (holding that expenses incurred to send
the taxpayer’s and his spouse’s children to boarding school did not constitute medical
expenses); Rodgers v. Comm’r, 241 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957) (holding that costs of trips to
states with milder climates did not constitute deductible medical expenses).
97. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 320 (1954).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii).
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expenditures.103 Subject to some exceptions, a capital expenditure cannot be
deducted in its entirety in the year in which it is incurred.104 The Treasury
Regulations provide, however, that a capital expenditure can qualify as a deductible
medical expense if it has as its “primary purpose” the “medical care” of the taxpayer,
the taxpayer’s spouse, or the taxpayer’s dependent. The Treasury Regulations go on
to provide that
[A] capital expenditure for permanent improvement or betterment of
property which would not ordinarily be for the purpose of medical care .
. . may, nevertheless, qualify as a medical expense to the extent that the
expenditure exceeds the increase in the value of the related property, if
the particular expenditure is related directly to medical care.105
In numerous cases, courts have ruled on whether some or all of a capital
expenditure that would typically be incurred for personal purposes can constitute a
deductible medical expense. Many of the cases involve swimming pools. For
instance, in Haines v. Commissioner, after the taxpayer underwent two operations
for a fractured leg,106 the taxpayer discussed with his doctor the benefits of swimming
as therapy, and his doctor recommended that he build a home swimming pool
because the taxpayer was a “busy man.”107 The taxpayer claimed a portion of the cost
of constructing the pool as a medical expense deduction.108 The court concluded that
the expenditure was not “related directly to” the taxpayer’s medical care.109 As a
result, the taxpayer was not entitled to any deduction.110 The court reasoned that the
taxpayer only required swimming as a form of exercise for a short period of time
during which he could have arranged to swim at a health club at a much lower cost.111
After that short time, the court reasoned that the taxpayer’s swimming routine was
not significantly different from any other individual who chooses to swim as a
preferred form of exercise.112 The court’s decision was also guided by its finding that
the doctor’s testimony suggested that building the pool at the taxpayer’s house was
not a medical necessity but merely made it more convenient for the taxpayer to
swim.113 In addition, the court viewed the fact that the taxpayer could only use the
pool for approximately one-half of the year as undercutting the taxpayer’s claim that
the pool was medically necessary.114

103. See I.R.C. § 263(a).
104. See id. (providing that, subject to some exceptions, “no deduction shall be allowed for
any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate”).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii).
106. 71 T.C. 644 (1979).
107. Id. at 646.
108. 71 T.C. at 645–46.
109. Id. at 647.
110. Id. at 649.
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 648–49.
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In Evanoff v. Commissioner, the court held that no portion of the cost of installing
a swimming pool was a deductible medical expense.115 The court noted that the
taxpayers could have obtained the benefits to their daughter of swimming by using
one of the available community swimming pools, and several other individuals made
use of the pool in addition to the taxpayer’s daughter.116 Along similar lines, in
Worden v. Commissioner, the court concluded that the taxpayer had failed to
establish that the primary purpose of a swimming pool was medical care.117 The
taxpayer installed a swimming pool in his backyard after his chiropractor advised
that swimming would help his chronic back problems, and the pool was used by other
members of the taxpayer’s family.118
The IRS issued a revenue ruling on the topic of medical expense deductions for
swimming pools.119 The ruling noted that a medical expense deduction is allowed for
a taxpayer’s cost of constructing a special exercise swimming pool to the extent the
expenditure exceeds any resulting increase in the value of the taxpayer’s property
where the taxpayer suffered from severe osteoarthritis, the taxpayer’s physician
prescribed a treatment of swimming several times a day, and the pool was specially
designed for therapy and not suitable for general recreational use.120
Some cases that have decided whether some or all of a capital expenditure that
would typically be incurred for personal purposes can constitute a deductible medical
expense have involved items other than swimming pools. For example, courts have
denied medical expense deductions for the cost of a tractor and a snowblower;121 the
cost of an automobile;122 the expenses of clothing, remodeling of a lake cottage, new
furniture and appliances;123 and the cost of a mechanical horse that the taxpayer had
purchased as exercise equipment.124 In other cases, courts have allowed medical
expense deductions. For instance, in Gerard v. Commissioner, the court held that the
installation of an air conditioner upon the advice of a physician because the
taxpayer’s daughter had cystic fibrosis was an expenditure for medical care and
deductible to the extent it exceeded the resulting increase in the value of the
taxpayer’s home.125 In Pols v. Commissioner, the court allowed a taxpayer to deduct
as a medical expense the excess of the cost of adding an attached garage over the
resulting increase in property value.126 The taxpayer had a medical condition that
made it difficult and dangerous for him to walk from a detached garage to his home
in the winter time, and his doctor concluded that having a garage near his home was
essential.127

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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One item on the IRS’s most recent list of topics on which it will not issue letter
rulings is “[w]hether a capital expenditure for an item that is ordinarily used for
personal, living, or family purposes, such as a swimming pool, has as its primary
purpose the medical care of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent, or is
related directly to such medical care” for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section
213.128 This topic was added to the no ruling list in 1982.129 Before that time, the IRS
issued various letter rulings on this topic—some specific to expenditures for
swimming pools and some regarding other items that are ordinarily used for personal,
living, or family purposes such as air conditioning units and similar equipment,130
reclining chairs,131 steam baths,132 dishwashers,133 pianos,134 clarinets,135 a first-floor
bathroom,136 treadmills,137 furniture,138 a separate room attached to a house,139 new
home siding,140 and cars.141 Some of the issued letter rulings allowed a medical
expense deduction while others denied one.
In the case of swimming pools, for instance, the IRS allowed a medical expense
deduction for the cost of installing a pool to the extent that it exceeded any resulting
increase in the value of a taxpayer’s home in three letter rulings. First, in a 1968 letter
ruling, the taxpayer purchased a home swimming pool following the taxpayer’s
doctor’s recommendation to do so to engage in therapeutic water exercises to treat a
hip condition.142 The IRS ruled that the taxpayer could claim a medical expense
deduction for the cost of the pool to the extent that it exceeded any resulting increase
in value of the taxpayer’s home.143 Second, in a 1982 letter ruling, the taxpayer had
osteoarthritis and had been advised by a doctor to swim several times each day to
slow the progression of the disease.144 There were no adequate swimming facilities
near the taxpayer’s home where the taxpayer could swim as regularly as the doctor

128. Rev. Proc. 2021-3, 2021-1 I.R.B. 140, § 3.01(43).
129. Rev. Proc. 82-65, 1982-2 C.B. 852 (amending Rev. Proc. 82-22 to add this item to the
list of issues on which the IRS will not issue letter rulings).
130. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5402169340A (Feb. 16, 1954) (air conditioning); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5403109320A (Mar. 10, 1954) (air conditioning); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
5907284550A (Jul. 28, 1959) (humidification and filtration system); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
6603294460A (Mar. 29, 1966) (air conditioning in a car); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8009080 (Dec.
6, 1979) (house and car air conditioners).
131. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5512324650A (Dec. 22, 1955), revoked by I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 5604274650A (Apr. 27, 1956).
132. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5701304800A (Jan. 30, 1957).
133. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5903195230A (Mar. 19, 1959).
134. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5903205410A (Mar. 20, 1959); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
6302264710A (Feb. 26, 1963).
135. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6205294660A (May 29, 1962).
136. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6809130350A (Sept. 13, 1968).
137. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8019025 (Feb. 12, 1980).
138. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8009080 (Dec. 6, 1979).
139. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7948029 (Aug. 28, 1979).
140. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8112069 (Dec. 29, 1980).
141. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8226162 (Apr. 6, 1982).
142. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6809100210A (Sept. 10, 1968).
143. Id.
144. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8208128 (Nov. 27, 1981).
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prescribed.145 The taxpayer arranged to have an indoor exercise pool constructed at
the taxpayer’s home.146 The pool was 8 feet wide by 36 feet long. It was equipped
with specially designed stairs to enable the taxpayer to get in and out of the pool, and
the pool had a steam hydrotherapy device to aid the taxpayer’s therapy.147 The pool
did not have a diving board and was not suitable for general recreational use.148 The
IRS concluded that the taxpayer could claim a medical expense deduction for the
cost of the pool to the extent that the costs were not more than the “minimum
reasonable costs of a functionally adequate facility” and to the extent that the costs
of such a facility exceeded any resulting increase in value of the taxpayer’s home.149
Third, in another 1982 letter ruling, the taxpayer’s son was born with lower thoracic
lumbar myelomeningocele, a condition affecting the spinal cord.150 As a result of the
condition, the son experienced paralysis in his lower limbs.151 The son’s doctor
prescribed swimming therapy several times a day.152 The doctor advised the taxpayer
to install a heated pool with certain features to accommodate the swimming
therapy.153 The nearby public pools were not maintained at the necessary temperature
and lacked the necessary equipment.154 The IRS ruled that “the amount paid for the
swimming pool is an expenditure made primarily for the medical care of your son”
and “[a]ccordingly, to the extent that the cost of the swimming pool does not exceed
the minimum reasonable cost of a functionally adequate facility, and to the extent
that such minimum reasonable cost exceeds the increase in value of your home as a
result of its installation, such cost is deductible as a medical expense.”155
In the case of the three letter rulings described above, the IRS allowed a medical
expense deduction for the cost of swimming pools to the extent the costs exceeded
any resulting increase in the value of the taxpayer’s home. By contrast, the IRS
denied a medical expense deduction for any portion of the cost of installing a
swimming pool in four letter rulings. First, in a letter ruling issued in 1977, the
taxpayer had a heart condition and the taxpayer’s doctor prescribed weight loss and
regular exercise.156 The taxpayer started distance swimming and installed a pool at
the taxpayer’s home because local public pools were not open at convenient times.157
The IRS denied a medical expense deduction because the taxpayer’s doctor did not
particularly prescribe swimming—any type of exercise would suffice.158 Second, in
a 1979 letter ruling, the taxpayer’s son had allergies that prevented him from
spending long periods of time outside, and he had asthma and was highly susceptible

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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to infections. As a result of these conditions, the taxpayer tried to keep him away
from crowds at public swimming pools.159 The taxpayer supplied two letters from
doctors stating that the taxpayer’s son had asthma and that the doctors recommended
swimming for exercise.160 The taxpayer requested a ruling regarding whether the
costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating a pool were deductible medical
expenses.161 The IRS ruled that they were not deductible medical expenses, pointing
to cases that have held that the costs of treatments that are merely beneficial to
general health and wellbeing—as opposed to the costs of treatments that are aimed
at alleviating a specific illness or disease—are not deductible medical expenses.162
Third, in a 1981 letter ruling, the taxpayer suffered from a heart attack and a heart
condition.163 The taxpayer’s doctors advised swimming five days per week to
facilitate recovery.164 The taxpayer constructed a pool at the taxpayer’s home.165 The
IRS ruled that the taxpayer was not entitled to a medical expense deduction for any
portion of the cost of constructing the pool, at least partly because the IRS took the
view that the taxpayer failed to establish that the construction of the pool was directly
related to medical care.166 The taxpayer had started to pay for its construction before
being advised to swim for exercise, and the taxpayer had not shown why the
construction of a pool was necessary to allow the taxpayer to swim.167 In any event,
the cost of the pool did not exceed the resulting increase in the value of the taxpayer’s
home, so no amount would have been deductible even if the construction of the pool
had been directly related to medical care.168 Finally, in another 1981 letter ruling, the
taxpayer’s son had cystic fibrosis.169 The son’s physician stated that anything that
allowed the son to exercise and increase his physical activity would be useful, and a
swimming pool would be “of value” but “not a necessity.”170 The IRS ruled that no
part of the cost of constructing a swimming pool was a deductible medical
expense.171
In addition to rulings about swimming pools and other capital expenditures,
before and after 1982, the IRS issued letter rulings regarding the ability to treat
noncapital expenditures as medical expenses in contexts where the expenses were
incurred for items ordinarily used for personal, living, or family purposes. For
example, in a 1956 letter ruling, the IRS concluded that the costs of vacations were
not deductible medical expenses because the trips were made for general
improvement of health and morale.172 In a 1964 letter ruling, the IRS decided that

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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the costs incurred for joining a golf, gun, fishing, or health club; the cost of hunting
and fishing licenses; and the costs of purchasing guns, fishing equipment, and golf
equipment did not qualify as medical expenses.173 In that ruling, the taxpayer’s
doctor had recommended recreational activities to treat hypertension, restore the
taxpayer’s feeling of good health, and reduce the risk of a heart attack.174 In a 1980
letter ruling, the taxpayer’s wife was under a doctor’s treatment for various
conditions and the recommended treatment involved only eating in restaurants and
not preparing food at home.175 The IRS concluded that a taxpayer was not entitled to
deduct as a medical expense any of the cost of restaurant meals.176 As a final
example, in a 1983 letter ruling, the IRS allowed the deduction of a $100 annual
swimming pool fee paid to allow the taxpayer’s son to swim pursuant to a doctor’s
recommendation that he swim three to four times per week as therapy for arthritis.177
C. Section 1031(f) and Related Party Like-Kind Exchanges
Determining whether a transfer constitutes a gift for income tax purposes is an
inherently factual inquiry because tax law’s characterization of a transfer as a gift
turns on whether the transferor’s intent was detached and disinterested generosity.
Gauging a person’s intent necessarily requires an examination of all the relevant
evidence. For similar reasons, determining whether the primary purpose of an
expenditure is medical care is an inherently factual inquiry. Tax law could supplant
these fact-based determinations with bright-line rules, but, if the goal is to determine
a transferor’s intent and the purpose of an expenditure as accurately as possible, tax
law needs to preserve flexibility to examine the relevant facts. To put it differently,
a bright-line rule would not do the trick because it would be both overinclusive
(leading to the conclusion that some taxpayers possessed the relevant intent even
when they did not) and underinclusive (leading to the determination that other
taxpayers did not possess the relevant intent even when they did).178 Thus, in the
context of gifts and medical expenses, we could think of facts and circumstances
tests as necessary because, as a definitional matter, tax law has opted for the
characterization of something as a gift or as a medical expense to turn on a taxpayer’s
motive or purpose which, in turn, must be assessed based on an examination of all
relevant facts.

173. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6406024950A (June 2, 1964).
174. Id.
175. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8024080 (Mar. 21, 1980).
176. Id.
177. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8326095 (Mar. 30, 1983).
178. For further discussion of the overinclusivity and underinclusivity of bright-line rules,
see, for example, Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 72–74 (1983); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993); Susan C. Morse, Safe
Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 1419–24 (2016); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 175 (2015) (“Any such rule
will either be too narrow (underinclusive) or too broad (overinclusive).”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 992–93 (1995).
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In the context of Section 1031(f) and in other contexts, tax law makes use of tests
based on facts and circumstances for purposes of assessing a taxpayer’s motive for a
slightly different reason. In particular, Section 1031(f)’s aim is to determine whether
a transaction was excessively tax motivated.179 Section 1031(f) contains standards
that supplement the more certain rules in other parts of Section 1031 as a means of
preventing taxpayers from engaging in overly tax-motivated transactions that
produce results that were not intended by lawmakers when crafting the Section 1031
rules.180 Section 1031(f) is based on facts and circumstances rather than more clearly

179. The staff of the Senate Committee on Finance summarized the legislative history
surrounding the adoption of Section 1031(f): “Because a like-kind exchange results in the
substitution of the basis of the exchanged property for the property received, related parties
have engaged in like-kind exchanges of high basis property for low basis property in
anticipation of the sale of the low basis property in order to reduce or avoid the recognition of
gain on the subsequent sale. Basis shifting also can be used to accelerate a loss on retained
property . . . A disposition also will not invalidate the nonrecognition treatment of the original
exchange if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that neither the
exchange nor the disposition had as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal
income tax.” STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 101ST CONG., REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF
1989: EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE 151–52 (Comm. Print
1989).
180. For discussion of the need to do this generally in tax law, see, for example, Noël B.
Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 33 (2004)
(“[P]romoters could easily concoct new abusive transactions that literally complied with the
rule.”); Andrew T. Hayashi, A Theory of Facts and Circumstances, 69 ALA. L. REV. 289, 291
(2017) (“If the facts that create a favorable inference about a hidden factor are publicized in
advance, they will provide a roadmap for well-advised individuals to create those very facts
to induce factfinders to draw the inference those individuals want.”); Calvin H. Johnson, H.R.
____, The Anti-Skunk Works Corporate Tax Shelter Act of 1999, 84 TAX NOTES 443, 445
(1999) (“Loopholes can be created in any human tax system unless the system is defended and
repaired.”); Logue, supra note 1, at 366 (“[I]t simply is not possible to write tax laws that are
devoid of all unintended loopholes.”); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting
the Code to Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 1722 (2003) (“The
mechanical terms of specific rules . . . provide a tremendous temptation to treat the rules as an
instruction manual for creating and structuring transactions outside the ordinary course of
business or normal investments in which the taxpayer would not engage except as a result of
the tax avoidance potential of the inventive transaction.”); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name:
Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 401, 409 (2010) (“[T]hese flaws create a playground for those who engage in
transactions that comply with . . . literal language, yet result in tax consequences that Congress
did not contemplate.”); Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It
Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 191, 192 (2002) (“Inevitably, there
will be some unforeseen interaction of the tax rules so that, if one arranges one’s affairs in just
the right manner, magic happens.”); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999). For similar discussion regarding rules generally, see, for
example, Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 178, at 179 (“Rules allow self-seeking
individuals to ‘walk the line’ by engaging in conduct that runs against society’s interest and
would be prohibited by a standard.”); Sunstein, supra note 178, at 995 (“Because rules have
clear edges, they allow people to ‘evade’ them by engaging in conduct that is technically
exempted but that creates the same or analogous harms.”).
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defined rules because clearly defined rules would merely produce other opportunities
for taxpayers to exploit those rules.181
To demonstrate the purpose of Section 1031(f), imagine the following facts.182
Anabel and Michael are siblings who own various real estate investment properties.
Anabel owns an apartment building with a basis of $70,000 and a fair market value
of $100,000. Michael owns an office building with a basis of $20,000 and a fair
market value of $100,000. A third party, Catherine, approaches Michael about the
possibility of acquiring the office building for $100,000. If Michael sold the office
building to Catherine for $100,000, Michael would recognize and be subject to tax
on $80,000 of gain (the $100,000 selling price minus his $20,000 basis in the office
building).
Under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer will not recognize
gain as a result of exchanging real estate held for investment purposes or in a trade
or business for other real estate held for investment purposes or in a trade or
business.183 The taxpayer’s basis in the new property will preserve any gain that had
accrued in the old property and was not recognized at the time of exchange.184 Were
it not for Section 1031(f), rather than Michael selling the office building to Catherine
for $100,000, Anabel and Michael might obtain a more favorable tax outcome by
first engaging in a Section 1031 exchange of the apartment building for the office
building and, second, having Anabel sell the office building to Catherine for
$100,000.
As a result of the Section 1031 exchange, neither Anabel nor Michael would
recognize any gain.185 After the exchange, Anabel’s basis in the office building
would be $70,000 (the same as her basis in the apartment building before the
exchange).186 As a result, when Anabel sells the office building to Catherine, if it
were not for Section 1031(f) and assuming the transactions are not recharacterized
under substance over form principles, Anabel would recognize and be subject to tax
on $30,000 of gain (the $100,000 selling price minus her $70,000 basis in the office
building).187 Thus, instead of Michael recognizing $80,000 of gain as a result of
selling the office building directly to Catherine, Anabel would recognize only
$30,000 of gain. The siblings would have reduced the amount of gain currently
recognized by $50,000.
Section 1031(f) likely prevents this outcome, however, assuming that Anabel’s
sale to Catherine occurs within two years of the siblings’ Section 1031 exchange.188
Section 1031(f) provides that if related parties189 engage in a like-kind exchange and

181. See supra note 180.
182. For additional discussion of Section 1031(f), see, for example, Emily Cauble,
Presumptions of Tax Motivation, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1995, 2010–13 (2020).
183. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
184. I.R.C. § 1031(d).
185. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
186. I.R.C. § 1031(d).
187. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
188. I.R.C. § 1031(f).
189. Related parties include not only family members but also various related entities, as
well as individuals and entities in which individuals own sufficient interests. I.R.C. §§
1031(f)(3), 267(b), 707(b)(1).
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one of the related parties disposes of the property acquired in the exchange within
two years, then, at the time of later disposition, both parties must recognize any gain
or loss that was not recognized at the time of the earlier like-kind exchange.190 As a
result, at the time Anabel sells the office building to Catherine, Michael likely
recognizes $80,000 of gain from sale of the office building, and Anabel likely
recognizes $30,000 of gain from sale of the apartment building.
Section 1031(f)(2)(C), however, provides that this gain recognition will not be
required if the taxpayers establish that neither the like-kind exchange nor the later
disposition had, as one of its principal purposes, the avoidance of federal income
tax.191 Whether taxpayers have established a lack of principal tax avoidance purpose
(in other words, the question of whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applies) is one item
on the current list of topics on which the IRS ordinarily will not issue letter rulings,
subject to two specified exceptions.192
Even if a transaction is not squarely covered by Section 1031(f), it might still be
vulnerable to attack. Section 1031(f)(4) provides that Section 1031’s nonrecognition
treatment is not available to any exchange that is “part of a transaction (or series of
transactions) structured to avoid the purposes” of Section 1031(f).193 This might
include, for instance, a transaction in which a third party is inserted into the exchange
between Anabel and Michael so that the initial exchange does not occur directly
between related parties.194 Likewise, it could include a transaction in which more
than two years passes between the Section 1031 exchange and the later sale, but the
related parties clearly planned the later sale at or close to the time of the Section 1031
exchange.195
The question of whether “a transaction (or series of transactions) was structured
to avoid the purposes” of Section 1031(f) (in other words, the issue of whether
Section 1031(f)(4) applies) is another item on the current list of topics on which the
IRS ordinarily will not issue letter rulings, subject to two specified exceptions.196
Both of these topics—namely whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applies and whether
Section 1031(f)(4) applies—were added to the list of items on which the IRS
ordinarily will not rule in 2014, subject to two specified exceptions.197 Regarding the
exceptions, the IRS remains willing to rule on these topics in instances in which (1)
a transaction involves an exchange of undivided interests in different properties that
results in each taxpayer holding either the entire interest in a single property or a
larger undivided interest in any of the properties, or (2) the subsequent disposition of
property occurs in a nonrecognition transaction in which the taxpayer or the related
party receives no cash or other property that results in gain recognition.198

190. I.R.C. § 1031(f).
191. I.R.C. § 1031(f)(2)(C). The parties also do not have to subsequently recognize gain or
loss in certain specified situations. See I.R.C. § 1031(f)(2)(A)–(B).
192. Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-3, I.R.B. 140, § 4.01(46).
193. I.R.C. § 1031(f)(4).
194. See also Cauble, supra note 182, at 2012.
195. Cauble, supra note 182, at 2012–13.
196. Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-3, I.R.B. 140, § 4.01(46).
197. Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-3, I.R.B. 111, § 1.02(11) (“Section 4.01(43), regarding §
1031(f), has been added.”).
198. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-3, I.R.B. 140, § 4.01(46).
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Two letter rulings issued before 2014 provide examples of the first exception.199
In one of those rulings, issued in 1999, the taxpayer and a related party each held an
undivided one-half interest in 39,000 acres of timberland.200 The taxpayer wanted to
hold the timberland as an investment and objected to anything more than minimal
cutting of timberlands during her lifetime.201 The related party wanted to harvest
timber.202 The taxpayer and the related party planned to engage in a like-kind
exchange of portions of their undivided interests in the timberland so that, afterwards,
each party would be the sole owner of one-half of the timberlands.203 The related
party planned to harvest timber within two years, which might be treated as a
disposition of the property within two years.204 The ruling concluded that the
transactions did not have, as one of their principal purposes, the avoidance of federal
income tax (in other words, Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applied), and, as a result, even if
harvesting the timber was a disposition, it would not cause the parties to recognize
gain under Section 1031(f).205
The ruling pointed to the legislative history accompanying the adoption of Section
1031(f).206 When explaining Section 1031(f)(2)(C), the Senate Finance Committee’s
report stated that it was intended that this nontax avoidance exception would
generally apply in limited situations, one of which is “a transaction involving an
exchange of undivided interests in different properties that results in each taxpayer
holding either the entire interest in a single property or a larger undivided interest in
any of such properties.”207
Under facts like those of the ruling just described, a plausible non-tax explanation
for the transactions exists. It appears that the two parties wanted to go their separate
ways with respect to property in which they each owned an undivided interest. The
exchange was undertaken as a means to divide the property into portions that each
owned individually so that each party could hold or dispose of a portion of the
property as the party chose. Likely, this potential nontax explanation for such a
transaction is what prompted the Senate Finance Committee to include it as an
example in its report and what prompted the IRS to include it as an exception to its
policy of generally not ruling on whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applies.
Several rulings issued before 2014 also provide examples of the second exception
to the IRS’s general policy of not ruling on whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) or Section
1031(f)(4) applies.208 For instance, in a 2010 letter ruling, the taxpayer, an unrelated

199. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199926045 (July 2, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200730002
(July 27, 2007).
200. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199926045 (July 2, 1999).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS
APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OCTOBER 3, 1989 (Comm. Print 1989).
208. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200440002 (Oct. 1, 2004); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200616005 (Apr. 21, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200810016 (Mar. 7, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 200810017 (Mar. 7, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200820017 (May 16, 2008); I.R.S. Priv.
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buyer, an unrelated seller, and an entity related to the taxpayer (the “related party”)
planned to engage in a multiparty like-kind exchange, using qualified intermediaries
to facilitate the exchange.209 From the taxpayer’s perspective, the transaction
involved an exchange, through a qualified intermediary, of Property #1 for Property
#2 and a small amount of cash.210 Property #2 was previously owned by the related
party, and Property #1 was acquired by an unrelated buyer.211 The taxpayer planned
to continue to hold Property #2 for at least two years.212 From the related party’s
perspective, the transaction involved an exchange, through a qualified intermediary,
of Property #2 for Property #3 and a small amount of cash.213 Property #3 was
formerly owned by either an unrelated seller or potentially the taxpayer or another
related party.214 The related party planned to hold Property #3 for at least two
years.215
Because the taxpayer and the related party each exchanged property with a
qualified intermediary, the Section 1031 exchanges did not occur directly between
related parties.216 However, because Property #2 obtained by the taxpayer was, prior
to the exchange, owned by the related party, the taxpayer sought a ruling on whether
Section 1031(f)(4) would apply (in other words, whether these transactions would be
considered to be structured to avoid the purpose of Section 1031(f)).217 The IRS ruled
that Section 1031(f)(4) would not apply.218 The ruling, once again, pointed to the
Senate Finance Committee’s report accompanying the adoption of Section
1031(f).219 This time it mentioned the second example in that report of a situation in
which Section 1031(f)(2)(C)’s nontax avoidance conclusion would generally
apply—namely when the disposition of property occurs in a nonrecognition
transaction.220 Under the facts of the ruling, the only transaction in which either party
engaged within two years was a Section 1031 exchange in which only a small amount
of gain was recognized (as a result of the receipt by each party of a small amount of
cash).221 Thus, the ruling’s facts aligned with the example provided by the legislative
history.
When the only subsequent disposition that occurs within two years is a transaction
in which a party does not recognize any gain or loss, the parties obtain no benefit at
the time of the disposition from having engaged in an earlier exchange that affected

Ltr. Rul. 201048025 (Dec. 3, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201216007 (Apr. 20, 2012); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201220012 (May 18, 2012).
209. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201048025 (Dec. 3, 2010).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS
APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OCTOBER 3, 1989 152 (Comm. Print 1989).
221. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201048025 (Dec. 3, 2010).
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the parties’ basis in the properties that they held. If no gain or loss is recognized, the
property’s basis does not affect the amount of gain or loss recognized. This rationale
is likely what justified the Senate Finance Committee including subsequent
nonrecognition transactions as an example in its report as well as what justified the
IRS including subsequent non-recognition transactions as an exception to its policy
of generally not ruling on whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) or Section 1031(f)(4) apply.
Even before the IRS added to the list of topics on which it ordinarily will not rule
the question of whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applies to a transaction, the IRS issued
a letter ruling declining to rule on the topic of whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applied.
In a 1991 letter ruling, a partnership (the “AB Partnership”) and a corporation (“C
Corp”) were related parties within the meaning of Section 1031(f).222 These two
related entities engaged in a like-kind exchange of real estate (the AB Partnership
exchanged an interest in Ranch A for an interest in Ranch C that was held by C
Corp).223 The AB Partnership already owned Ranch B which was next to Ranch C,
and it was more economical for the same entity to operate Ranch B and Ranch C.224
C Corp sought to exit the ranching business.225 Within two years of the exchange, C
Corp planned to sell its newly acquired interest in Ranch A to a third party.226 Given
that AB Partnership and C Corp were related and given that the subsequent sale
would occur within two years of the Section 1031 exchange, Section 1031(f) would
apply unless the parties established that the principal purpose of the transactions was
not to avoid federal income tax (in other words, unless Section 1031(f)(2)(C)
applied).227 The IRS declined to rule on whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) applied,
drawing an analogy to a topic on the no ruling list that existed at the time (namely
whether the principal purpose of an acquisition was the avoidance of federal income
tax in the context of Section 269).228 The ruling stated, “In this case, for which the
applicable statute invokes a similar principal purpose standard, we think it
appropriate and consistent for the Service to administratively decline to rule. . . . It
would be better policy to leave it to an examining agent to ascertain whether one of
the taxpayer’s principal purposes for engaging in this series of transactions is the
avoidance of Federal income tax.”229
Despite its hesitation to rule on these topics, before 2014, the IRS did issue a small
number of rulings regarding whether Section 1031(f)(4) applied to a transaction that
did not fall within the currently specified exceptions. In one such ruling, issued in
2007, the taxpayer sought to engage in two transactions with respect to two
properties.230 Each transaction involved the taxpayer disposing of property (the
“Relinquished Property”), and the taxpayer obtaining like-kind replacement property

222. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9126007 (June 28, 1991).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200728008 (July 13, 2007). For another example, see I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200712013 (Mar. 23, 2007).
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(the “Replacement Property”).231 The Replacement Property was owned by an
unrelated seller.232 A party related to the taxpayer (the “Related Party”) planned to
acquire the Relinquished Property for cash.233 The taxpayer, the unrelated seller, and
the Related Party would carry out the transactions through an intermediary.234 The
intermediary would sell the Relinquished Property to the Related Party for cash, the
intermediary would acquire the Replacement Property from the unrelated seller for
cash, and the intermediary would transfer the Replacement Property to the
taxpayer.235 From the taxpayer’s perspective, the transaction entailed a like-kind
exchange of the Relinquished Property for the Replacement Property.236 From the
perspective of the Related Party, this transaction involved acquiring the Relinquished
Property for cash equal to the value of the property.237 The Related Party planned to
sell the Relinquished Property within two years.238
Because the taxpayer and the Related Party exchanged property through an
intermediary, the Section 1031 exchanges did not occur directly between related
parties. However, because the Relinquished Property was acquired by a related party
who planned to sell it within two years, the taxpayer sought a ruling on whether
Section 1031(f)(4) would apply (in other words, whether these transactions would be
considered to be structured to avoid the purpose of Section 1031(f)). The IRS ruled
that Section 1031(f)(4) would not apply.239 The ruling stated, “The related parties in
this case did not exchange high basis properties for low basis properties in
anticipation of the sale of the low basis properties. Only [the taxpayer] held
properties before the exchanges and continued its investments after the exchange.”240
In other words, the Related Party who sold the property within two years had a basis
in the property that was not determined by reference to the basis in any other property
but rather equaled the amount paid by the Related Party for the property.
To demonstrate, imagine the Relinquished Property had a basis of $40 in the
hands of the Taxpayer and a fair market value of $100 at the time of the exchange,
and imagine the Replacement Property had a fair market value of $100 at the time of
the exchange. The taxpayer would recognize no gain on the exchange, and the
taxpayer would take a basis in the Replacement Property equal to $40. The Related
Party would take a basis in the Relinquished Property of $100. If the Related Party
subsequently sold the Relinquished Property for $100, the Related Party would
recognize no gain. However, the Related Party’s high basis in the property was not
created by transferring basis from other property held by the Related Party but instead
by the Related Party purchasing the property for $100. In this respect, the transactions
differ from the typical transactions at which Section 1031(f) is aimed that are
illustrated by the example above involving Anabel and Michael.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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Although this ruling did not involve facts that fall within the specified exceptions
contained in the IRS’s post-2014 policy against ordinarily issuing rulings on whether
Section 1031(f)(2)(C) or Section 1031(f)(4) applies, it is worth noting that the ruling
does involve facts that implicate the third example provided in the Senate Finance
Committee’s report of an instance in which an exchange and subsequent disposition
would typically not be principally tax motivated. That third example was
“transactions that do not involve the shifting of basis between properties.”241
In summary, as of 2014, the IRS’s official policy is to ordinarily not issue rulings
on whether Section 1031(f)(2)(C) or Section 1031(f)(4) apply to a transaction subject
to exception in two specified sets of circumstances—namely, where parties exchange
undivided interests in property so that each can obtain an entire (or a larger
undivided) interest in one property and where any subsequent disposition within two
years by the taxpayer or a related party occurs in a nonrecognition transaction in
which neither the taxpayer nor the related party recognizes gain.242 Even prior to
2014, the vast majority of rulings issued by the IRS regarding Section 1031(f)(2)(C)
or Section 1031(f)(4) involved these specified circumstances.243 In a very small
number of instances, the IRS did issue letter rulings concluding that Section
1031(f)(4) did not apply to a transaction even though the transaction did not involve
these specified circumstances.244 In those instances, however, the rulings involved
facts that tracked another example contained in the legislative history of a not
principally tax-motivated transaction.245
II. PARTICULAR USEFULNESS OF RULINGS ON FACT-SPECIFIC TOPICS
The fact-specific topics on which the IRS will not issue letter rulings (or ordinarily
will not issue letter rulings) arise in contexts in which tax law makes use of standards
in lieu of or as a supplement to rules. A “rule” specifies, clearly and in advance, the
tax consequences resulting from various activities.246 A “standard” provides only
limited guidance to taxpayers before they act, deferring definitive determinations of
tax consequences to after-the-fact analysis by courts.247 Whether something is a gift,

241. See STAFF OF COMM. ON FIN., 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS
APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OCTOBER 3, 1989 (Comm. Print 1989).
242. Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-3, I.R.B. 111, § 1.02(11) (“Section 4.01(43), regarding §
1031(f), has been added.”).
243. See supra notes 199–221 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 230–241 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 230–241 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (“This Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinction
between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are
undertaken before or after individuals act.”) (emphasis in original); see also Alice G. Abreu
& Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 330 (2011) (“A rule . . . is
formal, and in the great majority of circumstances the rule either clearly applies or clearly does
not.”).
247. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 246, at 330 (“Application of a standard tends to
be contextual and fact-sensitive.”); Kaplow, supra note 246, at 560 (“A standard may entail
leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the
adjudicator.”).
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whether something is a medical expense, whether Sections 1031(f)(2)(C) or
1031(f)(4) apply, and other fact-specific determinations are governed by standards.
Lawmakers do not specify ahead of time an exclusive list of facts that will be relevant
to the tax outcome or predetermine what the outcome will be under any given set of
facts.
As compared to rules, standards produce less certainty of tax outcome. Reduced
certainty matters for numerous reasons. First, as others have noted, when tax
outcome is not clearly specified, the IRS and courts have more discretion when
applying the law, which can lead to greater enforcement costs248 and less uniform
enforcement.249
Second, as others have observed, uncertainty may affect different types of
taxpayers differently.250 Some taxpayers may respond to uncertainty by erring on the
side of caution and potentially paying more in tax than they owe, while other

248. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 8, at 1437 (discussing how allowing taxpayers to obtain
certainty before filing their returns can save taxpayer and IRS resources that would otherwise
be used for enforcement and litigation); Edward Yorio, Federal Income Tax Rulemaking: An
Economic Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 43 (1982) (“More importantly, a rule that places
a heavy burden of proof on one of the parties will reduce the number of disputes between
taxpayers and the government because parties with the burden are likely to realize in many
cases that their chances for success are slim. Fewer disputes mean reduced transaction costs
of negotiations and litigation.”).
249. See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expectation that Public Officials Will
Act Consistently, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 549, 558 (1998) (“Throughout the legal system,
officials administer statutes or apply judicial precedents which require determinations based
on vague terms, such as ‘in the public interest.’ Inconsistent exercises of this discretion are
inevitable, and cannot all be remedied by judicial review.”); Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and
a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 372 (1993) (“An
important source of uncertainty is the discretion of lower-level bureaucrats.”).
250. See, e.g., Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW.
827, 837 (1995) (“The effect of [some anti-abuse rules] . . . is to erase the bright line or relocate
it for more cautious taxpayers. Those who are overly aggressive may use the vagueness and
ambiguity of the rule as an indirect endorsement of their proposals.”); Mark P. Gergen,
Reforming Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 173, 196–97
(1991) (“But an approach that uses indeterminate standards . . . invites abuse by those who
want to take advantage of the system. . . . At the same time, doubt is costly to those who want
to comply with the law, since they must employ attorneys who can plumb the mysteries of the
law to tell them what is safe.”); Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circumstances
Tests, and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287, 1303 (1996) (“Risk
aversion can produce unnecessarily conservative determinations by practitioners. Yet if the
risk of audit is perceived to be relatively slight, some professionals will ignore the ominous
implications of a faulty facts and circumstances analysis in favor of taking a turn at the roulette
wheel of the audit casino.”); Logue, supra note 1, at 374–75 (“[U]sing such legal uncertainty
in this way is a fairly imprecise tool for deterring aggressive tax planning, since some
taxpayers will be induced to over-comply and others, the less risk-averse, will be inclined to
take a chance and exploit the ambiguity.”); see also David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About
Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 249–50 (2002) (“[T]hose arguing against uncertainty . . . would
argue that taxpayers vary in their risk aversion, so that uncertainty affects taxpayers
differently.”). For a similar observation regarding standards in law generally, see, for example,
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985).
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taxpayers will exploit additional uncertainty by structuring their transactions more
aggressively and erring on the side of underreporting tax liability. These varying
effects of uncertainty may cause taxpayers to perceive the tax system as unfair, may
inspire more taxpayers to adopt aggressive reporting positions, and may prompt more
tax advisors to provide aggressive advice to compete for client business.251 For these
reasons and others, uncertainty may negatively affect tax compliance.252
The ability to obtain letter rulings could, to a degree, mitigate some of these
effects of uncertainty.253 In terms of enforcement costs, when a taxpayer seeks and
obtains a ruling from the IRS, the costs of considering and issuing the ruling are
typically covered, at least partially, by a ruling request fee paid by the taxpayer,254
and the costs incurred by the IRS when auditing that taxpayer are often lower than
they would have been without the ruling. As former IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb
noted, one of the benefits to the IRS of the letter rulings program is that “the work of
the auditing agents is also simplified. They need only verify that the facts of the
consummated transactions correspond to the facts in the rulings.”255 In addition, the
ability to obtain a ruling may reduce the likelihood of later litigation, another benefit
noted by the former IRS Chief Counsel.256
As mentioned above, more uncertainty might also lead to less uniform
enforcement. The ability to obtain letter rulings can also make enforcement more
uniform—in part because letter rulings entail more centralized decision making.257

251. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 250, at 1306 (“Other professionals are able to view the
numerous facts and circumstances tests as opportunities to take daring risks on behalf of
grateful clients who are consistently interested in tax avoidance.”). For more general
discussion of how tax planning opportunities can cause the public to perceive the tax system
as unfair or how perceptions of fairness can affect compliance, see, for example, Michael S.
Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates, and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54
TAX L. REV. 555, 555 (2001); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); David M. Schizer, Frictions
as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1319 (2001).
252. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, Kalmen Datt, Adrian Sawyer & Greg Weeks, Advance Tax
Rulings in Perspective: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis, 20 N.Z. J. TAX’N L. & POL’Y
362, 367 (2014); id. at 387 (“Offering taxpayers the opportunity to learn the requirements of
the tax law in advance should bolster tax compliance and tax morale more generally, even if
taxpayers are reluctant to use the rulings regimes.”); Osofsky, supra note 1, at 502–11
(describing various ways in which a lack of guidance might prompt certain taxpayers to be
more likely to take aggressive reporting positions).
253. For related discussion of the use of Advance Pricing Agreements to reduce
uncertainty, see, Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing
Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 143, 147 (2000) (“Ideally participating taxpayers obtain tax certainty before actually
engaging in their transactions.”).
254. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 App. A.
255. See, e.g., Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View From Within, 46 DUQ. L.
REV. 323, 344 (2008). For related discussion of the use of Advance Pricing Agreements, see
Ring, supra note 253, at 148 (“[A] successful APA program might reduce government
administration and enforcement costs . . . .”).
256. Rogovin & Korb, supra note 255, at 344.
257. Rogovin & Korb, supra note 255, at 344.

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 144

2/25/22 10:23 AM

2022]

IRS WON’T ANSWER

553

Furthermore, the publication of issued rulings in anonymized form makes issued
rulings more transparent than decisions the IRS makes on audit, for instance.258 This
transparency could encourage more consistency. Indeed, this rationale is often relied
upon as a justification for more transparency as a means of reducing the risk of the
IRS developing “secret law” if it makes decisions with respect to particular taxpayers
that are not publicized.259
Finally, uncertainty might cause different taxpayers to respond differently, with
conservative taxpayers reporting less favorable tax consequences than aggressive
taxpayers. To some degree, the ability to obtain letter rulings can mitigate this effect
by providing conservative taxpayers with another means of obtaining certainty. For
a taxpayer who seeks a ruling, that certainty will come at the cost of the expense of
preparing a ruling request and a ruling request fee. However, even without incurring
those expenditures, some taxpayers would benefit from some degree of additional
certainty as a result of the publication of issued rulings in anonymized form.260 If the
IRS publicized instances when taxpayers withdraw requests for a ruling in response
to an indication from the IRS that it might rule adversely, letter rulings could do even
more to mitigate the tendency of some taxpayers to report aggressively in response
to uncertainty.261
This is not to say that rulings would be a cure all for the effects of uncertainty.
Even with the ability to obtain rulings, some taxpayers would refrain from doing so
for a variety of reasons, including the cost and time involved and the fact that some
taxpayers might opt to take their chances on audit rather than request a ruling from
the IRS.262 Rather, the point is that the ability to obtain a ruling can mitigate
uncertainty in some cases. Moreover, in the case of a fact-specific topic, alternative
means of providing certainty—such as general guidance in the form of a revenue
ruling—may not be particularly viable. Precisely because the inquiry is fact specific,
developing generally applicable guidance is difficult. For this reason, other scholars
have noted that advance tax rulings may be particularly useful in areas of law where
tax outcome turns on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances.263 In other words, fact-

258. See infra notes 330–31 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Judy S. Kwok, The Perils of Bright Lines: Section 6110(K)(3) and the
Ambiguous Precedential Status of Written Determinations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 863, 870 (2005)
(“Indeed, one of the concerns motivating Congress to make these documents public was the
fear that this enormous body of tax knowledge and interpretation would result in a secret law,
the limited accessibility of which would undermine the private ruling system’s credibility.”);
Kristin E. Hickman, Should Advance Pricing Agreements Be Published?, 19 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 171, 174 (1998) (“Supporters of BNA’s position [that advanced pricing agreements
should be published] also express concern that a secret body of law is being developed with
respect to transfer pricing, and that similarly situated taxpayers may be treated unfairly as a
result.”); Ring, supra note 253, at 148 (“[T]he [Advance Pricing Agreement] program’s use
of private individualized agreements raises a number of risks . . . including the specter of
uneven application of substantive law.”).
260. Although, in some cases, the fact-specific nature of the question being addressed
could make the ruling less useful to other taxpayers. For further discussion, see infra Part III.E.
261. See infra notes 324–26 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 1, at 152–63.
263. See Alarie et al., supra note 252, at 382 (“[Advance tax rulings] can play a valuable
role when the government wants to provide tailored tax treatment to a specific category of

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 145

2/25/22 10:23 AM

554

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:523

specific topics may warrant the use of letter rulings even more than other topics
which is in tension with the IRS’s policy against ruling on such topics.
III. POTENTIAL RATIONALES FOR THE IRS’S RETICENCE
Despite the potential usefulness of letter rulings on fact-specific topics, the IRS
generally refrains from issuing such rulings. Eight potential rationales might explain
the IRS’s policy against ruling on fact-specific questions. This Part will proceed by
describing each of the eight potential rationales and analyzing whether each rationale
justifies a blanket policy against ruling or could, instead, be better served or equally
well served by other means. As this Part will show, some of the rationales have merit
and may warrant refraining from issuing letter rulings on a case-by-case basis. For
instance, if the taxpayer’s request does not contain sufficient facts to allow for a
ruling, refusing to rule makes a great deal of sense.264 However, the rationales do not
justify a blanket policy against issuing letter rulings on fact-specific topics.265
A. Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Be Overly Time Consuming
One factor that might explain the IRS’s policy against ruling on fact-specific
topics is the time involved in obtaining and analyzing all of the relevant facts needed
to reach a conclusion on such a topic. Indeed, other scholars have pointed to the time
and resources required to analyze fact-specific questions as one rationale for the
IRS’s refusal to rule on such questions.266

taxpayers whose members are not too numerous, and where it is difficult to craft a rule ex ante
to address a given situation because the taxpayer’s circumstances are too specific to
incorporate into legislation and regulations.”). Relatedly, see Yehonatan Givati, Game Theory
and the Structure of Administrative Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 490–91 (2014) (“[W]hen
firms are relatively homogenous, that is, when most of them are expected to have the same
reaction to a policy, then agencies should choose rule making as a policy-making instrument.
When firms are relatively heterogeneous, that is, when they are expected to have different
reactions to a policy, then agencies should choose either licensing or adjudication
supplemented with advance ruling.”).
264. For further discussion see infra Part III.C.
265. One might respond by arguing that, if the underlying factors tend to frequently weigh
against ruling on a particular fact-specific topic, announcing a blanket policy against ruling on
that topic ahead of time will save taxpayer and IRS resources by preventing taxpayers from
requesting rulings that are likely to be met by a refusal to rule. In the context of some topics,
refusals to rule may turn out to be common. However, this concern may also be addressed by
flagging the topic as one on which the IRS often will not rule and allowing a taxpayer to seek
an informal indication at the outset of whether the IRS would consider granting the ruling the
taxpayer seeks.
266. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 87–88 (“Moreover, while all relevant facts might be
extant at the time of the ruling request, it would require extensive investigation to extricate
them.”); Logue, supra note 1, at 409 (“[O]ne conceivable answer is that the Service simply
does not . . . have a large enough or sufficiently capable staff to do the factual and legal analysis
necessary to issue rulings on such fact-intensive questions without running a big risk of
adverse selection and moral hazard.”).
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There is no denying that the IRS faces increasingly significant resource
constraints. In 2018, for instance, the IRS employed the equivalent of 73,519 fulltime individuals, many fewer than the 92,577 individuals the IRS employed in
2009.267 Devoting a substantial amount of time to ruling on fact-specific topics may
not be the best use of the IRS’s remaining resources.
This potential rationale, however, overlooks several things. First, by not issuing a
ruling on a taxpayer’s fact-specific question, the IRS does not necessarily avoid
addressing the question altogether. If the IRS does not issue a ruling, the IRS must
still grapple with the time-intensive nature of the question if the IRS audits the
taxpayer.
Second, while this was not the case when the IRS started issuing letter rulings
(and started its policy of not ruling on certain topics),268 the IRS currently charges a
user fee for most ruling requests. The fee charged varies based on the type of
request,269 and the fees are generally designed to cover the costs incurred by the IRS
in considering and issuing the ruling.270 Indeed, the statute requiring the imposition
of a user fee provides that the fee shall be determined based on the average time and
difficulty of responding to taxpayer requests.271 For 2021, depending on the type of
request and other factors, the fee could range from $0 to $38,000.272 Various factors
limit the ability of the fees to completely cover the IRS’s costs.273 For instance,

267. Personnel Summary, by Employment Status, Budget Activity, and Selected Type of
Personnel, IRS (June 24, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-personnelsummary-by-employment-status-budget-activity-and-selected-type-of-personnel-databooktable-32 [https://perma.cc/AUZ2-FJ3N].
268. For discussion of this history, see, for example, Givati, supra note 1, at 150–69.
269. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, app. A.
270. Rogovin & Korb, supra note 255, at 347 (“The fees are based on calculations of the
actual cost to the Service of preparing the rulings . . . with discounted fees for lower income
taxpayers.”).
271. I.R.C. § 7528(b)(1)(B).
272. Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, app. A.
273. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL
ACCURATELY ADMINISTERED USER FEES BUT COULD IMPROVE ITS USER FEE REFUND PROCESS
1–2
(2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201710012fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NE5-49HL] (“Overall, Chief Counsel does not recuperate all costs
associated with administering the rulings because of reduced user fees, user fee exemptions,
cases for which the Chief Counsel does not rule, and a steady increase in the hours that it takes
to complete a ruling.”). User fees are also not a complete answer to resource constraints
because, at least over an immediate time horizon, staffing decisions are fixed. As a result,
additional fee revenue does not necessarily mean that more time on ruling requests does not
detract from other uses of the IRS’s time. However, over a longer time horizon, the IRS may
be able to make adjustments. The extent to which user fees will address resource constraints
also depends on the extent to which the fees are retained by the IRS or transferred to the U.S.
Treasury’s General Fund, which will depend on what Congress has specified in an
appropriations act. In 2004, for instance, of the $9.3 million of user fees collected from Chief
Counsel letter rulings and determination letters, $3.8 million was retained by the IRS. JAMES
R. WHITE, DAVID A. POWNER, STEVEN J. SEBASTIAN & GREGORY C. WILSHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IRS MODERNIZATION: CONTINUED PROGRESS REQUIRES ADDRESSING
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 17 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
120/111684.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAR8-KBZJ].
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reduced user fees are assessed in some circumstances, so the fees collected may not
always cover the costs incurred. In 2021, for example, a reduced letter ruling request
fee of $2800 applies to many requests from a person with a gross income of less than
$250,000.274 Also, because the fees are based on the average time and difficulty of
considering requests in a given category,275 the fee collected may be less than the
cost of any particular request.
Despite these limitations, the user fees can help to address resource concerns.
Moreover, changes to the user-fee schedule could do even more to address resource
constraints. For instance, the current user-fee schedule includes three tiers of user
fees based on gross income: one for taxpayers with less than $250,000 of gross
income, one for taxpayers with less than $1,000,000 of gross income but not less
than $250,000 of gross income, and one for taxpayers with $1,000,000 or more of
gross income.276 If more tiers were introduced into the user-fee schedule, fees that
came closer to the cost involved might be assessed upon taxpayers with higher
incomes while still providing relief to taxpayers who would be unable to shoulder
the burden of high user fees.
A third consideration that may be overlooked when pointing to resource
constraints as the justification for singling out fact-specific topics for the no-ruling
list is that, when requesting a ruling, the taxpayer must submit a request that contains
all of the relevant facts.277 The taxpayer cannot rely upon any issued ruling if the
taxpayer misstated or omitted any relevant facts.278 Thus, much of the cost of
gathering the relevant facts will be borne by the taxpayer rather than the IRS. As a
result, while resource constraints might necessitate generally cutting back on letter
rulings, it is not clear that rulings on fact-specific topics should be targeted as
particularly resource intensive, especially given that alternative means of providing
certainty may be ill-suited to fact-specific topics, as discussed below in Part III.H.
Finally, the IRS’s policy against ruling on fact-specific topics is a long-standing
one that has been in place even during times when the IRS’s resource constraints
were not as stringent.279 Given the longstanding nature of this policy against ruling
on fact-specific topics, it is worthwhile to consider whether any other rationales
justify the policy to gauge whether the policy would be appropriate even if the IRS
were equipped with more resources.
B. Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Pose a Heightened Risk of Taxpayer
Fabrication
A second factor that might explain the IRS’s refusal to rule on fact-specific
questions is a concern that the risk that taxpayers will fabricate or exaggerate certain
facts is heightened when taxpayers are providing information necessary for a factspecific inquiry. Many such inquiries are undertaken as a means of assessing a

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
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taxpayer’s motive or purpose for engaging in a particular transaction.280 Others have
expressed the concern that motive-based or state-of-mind-based tax determinations
invite taxpayer dishonesty as a general matter.281 Furthermore, another commentator
pointed to the potential for taxpayer dishonesty as a possible reason for the IRS’s
refusal to rule on topics that turn on issues such as intent or motive.282
However, while concern about undetected taxpayer dishonesty might be a
potential drawback to utilizing a motive-based determination in the first place, once
lawmakers have opted for tax consequences to turn on motive or purpose, the risk of
potential taxpayer fabrication does not justify refraining from ruling on such topics.
If a motive-based determination invites deceit, the IRS must cope with that
possibility when auditing a taxpayer even if a letter ruling was not issued to the
taxpayer. The IRS’s task is not made any more difficult if a favorable ruling was
issued to the taxpayer based upon inaccurate facts because a taxpayer cannot rely
upon a ruling if the taxpayer did not accurately and completely disclose the relevant
facts when requesting the ruling.283
Even though a taxpayer cannot rely upon a ruling that was issued based upon
inaccurate taxpayer representations, the concern may be that, once a letter ruling is
issued, the IRS might direct its resources elsewhere and not uncover the deception.
If a letter ruling had never been issued, perhaps in a face-to-face audit the IRS would
have been more likely to uncover the deception that went unnoticed during the ruling
process, which may not have entailed face-to-face interaction (although that is not
inevitably the case).284 This concern, however, does not justify a blanket refusal to
issue rulings on fact-specific topics for two reasons. First, it may be overly optimistic
to assume a higher chance of detecting the deception on audit, given the low audit
rate and given that many audits that do occur are not face-to-face. For one recent data

280. Indeed, asking for a ruling on a topic that turns on motive or state of mind may seem
a bit odd—effectively like asking the IRS to tell you what your motive (or another party’s
motive) was. Perhaps a more coherent way to understand such a request is that the taxpayer is
asking the IRS if it agrees about what motive or state of mind ought to be inferred from the
available objective evidence that is used to gauge motive or state of mind.
281. See, e.g., Hayashi, supra note 180, at 299–300 (discussing how this concern has been
raised in the case of intent-based tests).
282. Goodman, supra note 23, at 88 (“This would not be of overriding significance if the
Commissioner could attach credence to the facts as stated by the taxpayer; however, issues
such as intent and relationship are particularly susceptible to coloration of the facts by the
taxpayer in his favor.”).
283. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5). Others have suggested, however, that the IRS may
not make full use of its ability to revoke rulings. See Logue, supra note 1, at 410 (“The Service,
as mentioned, does have the authority to revoke a ruling after-the-fact if it can show that there
were demonstrable misstatements in the ruling request. Such misstatements, however, may be
difficult to identify, much less prove; in any event, issuing such a retroactive revocation may
be administratively and politically costly.”).
284. When requesting a ruling, a taxpayer can request a conference with the IRS, but some
rulings may be issued without conferences. Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 10.01 (“A
taxpayer may request a conference regarding a letter ruling request. Normally, a conference is
scheduled only when the Associate office considers it to be helpful in deciding the case or
when an adverse decision is indicated.”).
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point, consider that, in 2018, the IRS audited only 0.5% of all returns filed,285 and
roughly 25% of the audits that did occur were field audits rather than correspondence
audits.286 Second, in lieu of simply not issuing rulings, the IRS could address the
concern that the IRS may be misled by requests for rulings on fact-specific topics by
not allowing the issuance of a ruling to reduce the likelihood of the IRS verifying the
underlying facts on audit (which may very well be consistent with the IRS’s current
practice).
C. Taxpayers May Lack Necessary Facts When Requesting a Letter Ruling on a
Fact-Specific Topic
Third, in some circumstances, the taxpayer will not be the person best positioned
to provide the IRS with all of the facts relevant to a fact-specific inquiry. As others
have noted, this could be the case because some facts may not be known until later
in time; after a transaction is completed, for instance.287 This could also be the case
because the taxpayer may lack access to the relevant information or lack necessary
expertise. For instance, when evaluating whether the primary purpose of an
expenditure is medical care and whether the expenditure is directly related to medical
care, the taxpayer’s doctor might be the best source of some of the relevant
information. Although a doctor’s recommendation or prescription is neither
necessary288 nor sufficient289 for the IRS or a court to conclude that an expenditure
was primarily for medical care or directly related to medical care, a doctor’s
recommendation or prescription is one factor that courts and the IRS consider.290
Moreover, in some cases in which courts have concluded that an expenditure was not
for medical care, the courts appeared to reach this holding in part based on the failure
of the taxpayer to offer expert witness testimony from a doctor who had
recommended the expenditure. For instance, in Dobkin v. Commissioner, the court
held that the cost of a trip to Florida was not a deductible medical expense.291 The

285. Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax
After Examination, by Type and Size of Return, IRS (June 24, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-examination-coverage-recommended-andaverage-recommended-additional-tax-after-examination-irs-data-book-table-9a
[https://perma.cc/3JAD-F3XY].
286. Id. (showing that, of 991,168 returns that were audited, only 249,768 involved field
audits while 741,400 were correspondence audits).
287. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 87. For a related observation, see Samuel L. Bray,
Preventative Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1329 (2010) (“Contrast a case of factbased indeterminacy. . . . [H]ere a judge will often be in a better (or at least a different) position
to decide if adjudication is delayed. . . . [D]elaying adjudication could very possibly change
the question that the court is answering and thus the answer it gives.”).
288. See, e.g., Crain v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 806, 807 (1986) (deductions for medical
care “are not limited strictly to traditional medical procedures”).
289. See, e.g., Seymour v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 1111, 1117 (1950) (“The statute deals with
‘expenses paid for medical care of the taxpayer.’ Not every expenditure prescribed by a
physician is to be catalogued under this term . . . .”).
290. Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949) (listing, as among the relevant factors to
consider, whether it was “incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician”).
291. 15 T.C. 886, 888 (1950).
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court noted that, although at least one doctor advised the taxpayer to take the trip, the
taxpayer’s doctor did not testify.292 Similarly, in France v. Commissioner, the court
held that amounts the taxpayer paid for dancing lessons did not constitute deductible
medical expenses.293 The taxpayer had attached to her tax return statements from her
doctor indicating that he recommended dancing lessons as therapy for arthritis, but
the court noted that “[t]he doctor was not called as a witness.”294
Thus, the IRS may refrain from ruling on some fact-specific topics because of the
view that determinations based, in part, upon advice of an expert are better left to
courts that can take into account the expert’s testimony. This concern, however, does
not justify refraining from issuing rulings on fact-specific questions entirely for
several reasons. First, some fact-specific inquiries can be resolved without
information from other parties. Second, as part of the ruling request, the taxpayer
must include a complete statement of all of the relevant facts,295 and “[t]rue copies
of all . . . documents pertinent to the transactions must be submitted with the
request.”296 This latter requirement could include, or could be revised to include,
affidavits from the taxpayer’s doctor regarding the medical necessity of the
expenditure. To address any concern that any lack of credibility would be more easily
revealed by live testimony, it is useful to, once again, bear in mind that a taxpayer
cannot rely upon a favorable letter ruling if the ruling was based upon misstatements
or omissions of material facts or if later developed facts differ materially from the
facts upon which the ruling was based.297
D. Issuing Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Be Inconsistent with the
Comparative Advantages of the National Office Versus Auditing Agents
Similar to the notion that the fact finder at the trial level is better positioned to
determine facts while appellate court judges are better positioned to determine law,
the IRS’s refusal to rule on fact-specific questions may be driven by the view that,
as between individuals at the IRS’s national office who issue rulings and local
auditing agents, the former have a comparative advantage when it comes to making
judgments of law while the latter have a comparative advantage when it comes to
finding facts.
While this may be an accurate description of comparative advantages, this
rationale ignores that issuing a ruling on a fact-specific topic does not meaningfully
involve fact finding by the persons issuing the ruling. A taxpayer can only rely upon
the ruling if the taxpayer provides the IRS with complete and accurate facts when
requesting the ruling,298 and thus, the taxpayer must either supply the relevant facts
or risk not being able to rely upon the ruling if an examining agent later finds
additional or contrary facts. If the IRS reaches a conclusion on a fact-specific topic
based upon facts supplied by the taxpayer, doing so involves not fact-finding but

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
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Id. at 509.
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making a judgment about how the law will apply to the facts that were supplied by
the taxpayer.
It is true that, in some cases, the taxpayer’s request may not contain enough
information to allow for a worthwhile ruling on a fact-specific topic. In those
instances, the ruling’s limited benefit may not justify the taxpayer and IRS resources
used to produce the ruling. Some letter rulings that were issued on the question of
whether a transfer constitutes a gift illustrate this potential drawback to ruling on
fact-specific topics. For example, in a 1970 letter ruling, the taxpayer had requested
a ruling regarding whether amounts received while panhandling constituted gifts.299
The ruling assumed various facts that were not supplied by the taxpayer (for instance,
the ruling assumed that the taxpayer did “not perform any services . . . in the course
of his ‘panhandling’ activities”).300 If these assumed facts were not true, the ruling’s
usefulness to the particular taxpayer would be limited. Also, the ruling hedged its
ultimate conclusion in a way that reduced its value to the particular taxpayer as well
as its potential to act as a general guide to the IRS’s views for all taxpayers. In
particular, the ruling stated, “[I]f passersby contribute to you out of purely charitable
motives, or from a disinterested generosity or similar impulse it would be proper to
regard such amounts as gifts.”301 Read one way, this does little more than simply
articulate the legal standard for when something constitutes a gift for income-tax
purposes.302 As discussed above in Part I.A, whether something constitutes a gift for
income-tax purposes hinges on whether the transferor made the transfer out of
detached and disinterested generosity. Thus, the panhandling ruling’s conclusion, in
a sense, amounts to stating that, assuming the transfers are gifts for income-tax
purposes, they are gifts for income-tax purposes. Perhaps what the drafters intended
by this statement in the ruling was, instead, something like, “Assuming the taxpayer
provided no services or anything else of value in exchange for the amounts received
from panhandling, then it would be proper to regard such amounts as gifts.” If so, the
conclusion ought to have been phrased in that way. Such phrasing would have made
the ruling more useful to the particular taxpayer (provided the assumed facts were
true) as well as more valuable to taxpayers in general because it would do more than
simply restate the existing legal standard.
While some rulings on fact-specific topics might not be particularly valuable to
the taxpayers who seek them, this risk does not necessarily justify a blanket policy
against issuing such rulings. First, given that taxpayers must pay a ruling request fee
that covers the cost of issuing a ruling, to some extent, we can count on the taxpayer

299. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7004070460A (Apr. 7, 1970).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. On the other hand, if it is possible that courts might depart from a standard based on
the intent of a transferor in some cases, then this conclusion could be viewed as doing
something other than merely articulating the legal standard. For discussion of the possibility
that a departure from a standard based on the transferor’s intent may be warranted in some
cases, see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts”—The Income Tax
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 481–83
(2003); Jeffrey Kahn, GoTaxMe: Crowdfunding and Gifts, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 180, 192–98
(2018).
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to decide whether the risk that the ruling request does not include all material facts
makes the ruling not sufficiently valuable to justify the cost. Indeed, a note written
at a time when the IRS did not assess fees for letter ruling requests observed that
levying fees could be an alternative to simply not issuing rulings on fact-specific
topics, at least when the refusal to rule is inspired by the risk that the ruling might
prove to be useless to the taxpayer based on later-developed facts.303 As the note
observed, if the taxpayer must pay a fee to cover the cost of the ruling, we could
“leave it to the taxpayer to decide whether the cost involved is less than the value”
of the ruling.304 Second, the IRS could take steps to mitigate the risk that rulings will
not be particularly worthwhile. For instance, if a ruling request contained very
limited facts, rather than assuming facts that were not stated, the IRS could decline
to rule unless and until the taxpayer submitted an updated request with additional
facts. In addition, when the IRS does have sufficient facts to rule, it can avoid
phrasing conclusions in ways that merely restate the applicable legal standard,
making clear that its ruling stands as long as the ruling request contains an accurate
description of all material facts.
E. Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Be of Limited Value to Other
Taxpayers
While only the taxpayer to whom a letter ruling is issued can rely upon it,305 a
letter ruling, nonetheless, can offer a useful guide to other taxpayers of the IRS’s
likely position on the tax treatment of particular events or transactions.306 In the case
of a fact-specific question, however, a ruling’s potential value to other taxpayers may
be particularly insubstantial. Unless another taxpayer’s facts exactly match the facts
of the ruling, the predictive power of the ruling is lower in the case of a fact-specific
inquiry than it would be when the inquiry is less fact-specific. Indeed, as others have
noted, a similar phenomenon arises in the context of judicial determinations
regarding fact-specific questions: when the question involved is very fact specific,
previously decided cases provide less of a clear guide as to the likely outcome of a
future case.307

303. Goodman, supra note 23, at 90.
304. Id.
305. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(1) (1967) (“A taxpayer may not rely on an advance
ruling issued to another taxpayer.”).
306. Holmes, supra note 8, at 1427 (noting that letter rulings can act as a useful guide in
this way). Beyond acting as a guide to other taxpayers, in at least some cases, courts have cited
to private letter rulings as persuasive authority and used them for other purposes. For
discussion of use by courts of private letter rulings, for example, see Paul L. Caron, Tax
Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to
Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 669 (1996) (“[T]axpayers and the Service nevertheless
cite letter rulings in their arguments, and courts often refer to letter rulings in the course of
their opinions.”); Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an
IRS Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 338 (2006) (“[S]ome courts, including the
Supreme Court, have looked to private letter rulings for evidence of administrative
interpretation.”); Kwok, supra note 259, at 877–85; Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require
the Internal Revenue Service to be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 418–22 (1985).
307. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 287, at 1328 (“For example, a system might allow
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The value of a ruling on a fact-specific topic to other taxpayers may also be
lessened because some issued rulings include redactions that make it potentially
difficult for other taxpayers to ascertain whether their facts are the same as the facts
upon which another taxpayer’s ruling was based. And, of course, if a topic is fact
specific, knowing all of the facts of a previous ruling is even more crucial when
attempting to determine whether the previous ruling sheds any light on the likely tax
treatment of another taxpayer. Indeed, in another context, the concern that the factspecific nature of determinations may reduce their value to other taxpayers—
particularly after the redaction of relevant information—has been used to support an
argument against the publication of advanced pricing agreements or to support an
argument that the Service would need to supplement them with additional, general
guidance.308
While it may be true that rulings on fact-specific topics offer less valuable
guidance to other taxpayers than rulings on topics that are less fact specific, this
observation does not necessarily justify a categorical policy against ruling on a factspecific topic. For one thing, to some extent, this observation may suggest that the
IRS should be more inclined to rule on such topics rather than less inclined to do so.
The fact-specific nature of an inquiry makes it so that rulings that were issued on a
given topic prior to its addition to the no-ruling list may offer little value to other
taxpayers, making taxpayers’ continued need for additional rulings on these topics
even greater.
Second, it is useful to bear in mind that taxpayers who seek a ruling must pay a
ruling request fee generally designed to cover the cost to the IRS of considering and
issuing the ruling. Therefore, the fact that a ruling offers little benefit to other
taxpayers may be less of a concern than it would be without a fee (in which case
other taxpayers would subsidize the ruling). Moreover, while the letter ruling may
be of limited use to other taxpayers, it does serve the goal of providing certainty to
the taxpayer who requested it, which may make it possible for that taxpayer to carry
out a transaction that the taxpayer might not have undertaken without the additional
certainty. In response, one might raise the concern that issuing rulings on factspecific topics will result in providing certainty only to taxpayers who can afford the
filing fee. However, even without the ability to obtain a ruling on such topics, the

preventive adjudication in any case of lexical indeterminacy, but not in cases of fact-based
indeterminacy. There are good reasons to do this, because deciding lexical indeterminacy
cases brings a greater return at a lower cost. Resolving one case of lexical indeterminacy can
remove legal uncertainty in many other cases, because lexical indeterminacy is ‘chunky’
(involving large groups of essentially identical cases).”); Yorio, supra note 248, at 23 (“A
multifactor test increases the costs of the legal system in another more subtle way. Since the
outcome of each case turns on a balancing test involving a number of different facts, the
precedential value of any decision is lessened.”).
308. Hickman, supra note 259, at 191 (“Given the facts and circumstances nature of
transfer pricing methodologies and advance pricing agreements, to preserve confidentiality,
the IRS would have to cut out so much information that the published version would be
virtually useless for taxpayer guidance purposes.”); Ring, supra note 253, at 215 (“Based on
the considerations outlined, disclosure of redacted APAs seems required. To the extent their
‘Swiss cheese’ nature would render them less than illuminating, the Service could complement
their content with more explanatory general guidance.”).
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unfortunate fact is that taxpayers with financial resources will be more able than
taxpayers with limited resources to obtain assurances by obtaining legal advice. It is
possible that continuing to offer letter rulings with discounted ruling request fees for
taxpayers with limited resources would do a better job of allowing taxpayers with
limited resources to obtain certainty than simply refraining from ruling on factspecific topics altogether.309
Third, an examination of rulings that were issued on fact-specific topics prior to
their additions to the no-ruling list suggests that such rulings are not, inevitably,
useless to other taxpayers. In particular, some of the rulings on fact-specific topics
address fact patterns that may be fairly common fact patterns, so other taxpayers are
likely to engage in transactions virtually identical to the transaction in a ruling. For
instance, consider the 1985 letter ruling discussed above in which the IRS declined
to rule on whether certain payments made by an organization that provided
vocational development services to clients with disabilities constituted gifts.310
Assuming many clients participated in the program or similar programs, a ruling
would have addressed a question that affected numerous taxpayers. As another
example, consider the 1984 ruling mentioned above in which the IRS ruled that a
monetary award received by an assistant professor at a large university was not a gift
where the award was sponsored by various private companies and “given to junior
faculty members who had demonstrated . . . abilities in research and teaching.”311
The ruling suggested that other professors at that university received awards under
virtually identical circumstances, and likely professors at other universities had as
well.312 Thus, the ruling provided a potentially useful guide to taxpayers other than
the one who obtained the ruling.
Fourth, regarding redactions, the IRS has, from time to time, issued rulings that
redact material facts that would make it difficult for another taxpayer to assess
whether his or her facts are sufficiently close to the facts of the ruling to give the
ruling predictive power. Consider, for instance, the 2010 ruling regarding Section
1031(f) discussed above in which the conclusion appeared to turn, in part, on the fact
that the taxpayer had received only a small amount of cash.313 Given that the amount
of cash received was redacted, it would be difficult for other taxpayers to judge
whether the facts of their transactions were consistent with the facts in the ruling. To
address the issue of redactions making rulings less useful, however, rather than flatly
refusing to issue rulings on fact-specific topics, the IRS could decline to rule in any
circumstance in which material facts would be redacted if a ruling were issued.
Certain information that is exempt from public disclosure is redacted from
published letter rulings.314 When requesting a letter ruling, a taxpayer must include

309. The most recent revenue procedure provides for a reduced letter ruling request fee of
$2800 if the request involves “a personal, exempt organization, governmental entity, or
business tax issue” from a person with gross income of less than $250,000. Rev. Proc. 20211, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, app. A.
310. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
311. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8442027 (July 12, 1984); see supra notes 56–60 and
accompanying text.
312. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8442027 (July 12, 1984).
313. See supra notes 208–221 and accompanying text.
314. I.R.C. § 6110(c).
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a “deletion statement” with the request.315 In this statement, if the taxpayer wants
information deleted that extends beyond names, addresses, and identifying details,
the taxpayer must specify what information they want deleted and the statutory basis
for each proposed deletion.316 When deciding whether to rule in response to a
particular request, the IRS could take into account whether honoring the proposed
deletions would make the basis for the ruling inscrutable by other taxpayers and
decline to issue a ruling in such cases.
F. Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Create a Roadmap for Tax Abuse
Another consideration that might underlie the IRS’s reluctance to rule on certain
fact-specific topics is the concern that doing so might create a roadmap for taxpayers
to follow to obtain more favorable tax consequences than what their transactions, in
fact, warrant. This concern may arise particularly when the fact-specific question
entails determining whether a transaction was overly tax motivated as is true in the
case of the topics related to Section 1031(f) on which the IRS ordinarily will not
issue letter rulings. A concern about potential abuse might also underlie the IRS’s
decision to no longer issue rulings on the deductibility of the cost of swimming pools
and similar items.317 In these contexts, the IRS’s hesitation might be driven, in part,
by a concern that providing too much certainty regarding an anti-abuse provision’s
contours will allow taxpayers to disguise their overly tax-motivated transactions as
not so motivated.318
Relatedly, given the concern about creating a roadmap for tax abuse, when the
IRS does issue letter rulings concluding that a transaction is not overly tax motivated,
the IRS might have a tendency to rule on only the easy cases where lack of tax
motivation is readily apparent. Some of the rulings that have been issued relating to
Section 1031(f) might be characterized in this way—in other words, viewed as
dealing with fairly easy cases.319 To the extent that rulings issued on the topic of

315. Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 7.01(12).
316. Id.
317. See Ferris v. Comm’r, 582 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Congress was
responding to the hardship imposed when a taxpayer incurred extraordinary medical expenses
but was obliged to pay income taxes on funds used to defray them. It nonetheless recognized
that its choice would allow deductibility of expenses ‘for facilities, devices, services, and
transportation which are of the types customarily used, or taken, primarily for other than
medical purposes,’ and expressed its concern over the possibilities of abuse in such areas,
swimming pools being specifically cited.”) (citations omitted).
318. This can be a concern, in general, regarding providing clear rules in tax law; clear
rules may serve as a roadmap for taxpayers who want to engage in abusive transactions that
comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of the law. For discussion of this concern, see supra
note 180.
319. For discussion of rulings in this area, see supra Part I.C. See also Joshua D. Blank,
The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 449, 494 (2017) (“Mandatory public
release of the IRS’s advance tax rulings and agreements also poses little risk of encouraging
taxpayers to increase their use of tax avoidance strategies in order to meet benchmarks of tax
aggressiveness. Unlike the tax positions that trigger audits and tax controversies over
deficiency assertions, the issues that are the subject of advance tax rulings are not aggressive
tax positions that rely on questionable interpretations of the tax law.”).
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whether a transaction is overly tax motivated might tend to be limited to easy cases,
the value of such rulings may be low in that the rulings merely provide answers that
taxpayers tend to expect even without a ruling.320 If this is true, perhaps not much is
lost by simply refraining from ruling on such topics altogether.
While these considerations have merit, they do not justify refraining from issuing
rulings on fact-specific topics in all cases. First, this concern is not as relevant in the
context of fact-specific determinations that do not, directly, relate to whether a
transaction is excessively tax motivated.
Second, the concern that rulings on whether transactions are excessively tax
motivated will create a roadmap for tax abuse may be overstated. Taxpayers other
than the taxpayer to whom a ruling was issued cannot rely upon it.321 Therefore, if
another taxpayer did design a transaction in an attempt to imitate the facts of a ruling
in circumstances in which the taxpayer’s transaction was, in fact, excessively tax
motivated, the existence of the ruling does not grant favorable tax treatment to the
taxpayer’s transaction. Despite the fact that other taxpayers cannot rely upon the
ruling, many taxpayers may, nevertheless, use the ruling as a guide in planning their
own transactions. As a result, the conclusion of the ruling could affect tax
consequences claimed by other taxpayers which could go unchallenged if the
taxpayers are not audited. However, it is not clear that the effect of the ruling would
be to cause taxpayers to engage in even more aggressive transactions because, absent
the ruling, some may have operated under assumptions about tax law that were even
more taxpayer favorable than what the ruling provided.
Rather than simply imitate the facts of an issued letter ruling, a taxpayer might go
a step further and request his or her own ruling, using an issued ruling as a model of
the sort of facts to recite in his or her ruling request. Even if such a taxpayer does
obtain his or her own favorable ruling, however, it will not necessarily prevent the
IRS from later auditing and challenging the claimed tax consequences if the ruling
request omitted other material facts that show the transaction to be more tax
motivated than it appeared to be based upon the facts in the request.
Third, withholding guidance to create uncertainty and deter excessively taxmotivated transactions can affect different taxpayers differently.322 It may only
succeed in deterring conservative taxpayers and emboldening aggressive
taxpayers.323 Furthermore, even if the IRS is only willing to issue rulings on fairly
easy cases, conservative taxpayers might value the certainty afforded by such a
ruling. Indeed, given that taxpayers must pay a ruling request fee generally designed

320. For discussion of this phenomenon in the context of examples in regulations, see
Susan C. Morse & Leigh Osofsky, Regulating by Example, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 127, 151–
52 (2018) (“A regulatory example that gives an obvious answer in an easy case does not offer
as much valuable legal content as an example that gives a result in a hard case, or even merely
identifies the hard case.”).
321. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(1) (1967).
322. See supra note 250.
323. We might view this disparate effect of uncertainty as undesirable for reasons
discussed above. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of
various ways in which uncertainty can embolden aggressive taxpayers, see Osofsky, supra
note 1, at 502–11 (describing various ways in which a lack of guidance might prompt certain
taxpayers to be more likely to take aggressive reporting positions).
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to cover the costs incurred by the IRS in considering and issuing a ruling, if a
taxpayer does not think that a ruling on an easy case is valuable enough to justify the
cost of the ruling, the request fee ought to discourage the taxpayer from requesting
such a ruling.
Finally, refraining from issuing rulings on whether transactions are overly tax
motivated sacrifices an opportunity to issue adverse rulings which might help to curb
tax avoidance. As another commentator observed, “[a]lthough the Commissioner is
justified in not wanting to give an advance stamp of approval regarding such issues
as intent, it should be possible for him to rule whether, on the face of the ruling
request together with any facts learned in conference, he does find an intent to avoid
taxes.”324
The ability to use adverse rulings to curb tax avoidance is constrained by the fact
that taxpayers will often withdraw their ruling requests when the IRS plans to issue
an adverse ruling, so oftentimes, letter rulings that would have been adverse are not
made public but are only known to the taxpayer who requested them.325 Nevertheless,
a potentially adverse ruling can still deter the particular taxpayer who requested it.
The request for the ruling also informs the IRS of the transaction so the IRS could
publish a revenue ruling if the issue raised by the request is likely to be a recurrent
one affecting multiple taxpayers. Moreover, Professor Blank has proposed that the
IRS should be required to publicize circumstances in which a taxpayer withdraws a
request prior to the IRS issuing a ruling.326 Such a requirement could amplify the
effects of rulings that would have been adverse but are never issued.
G. Letter Rulings on Fact-Specific Topics May Cause Taxpayers to Perceive
Inconsistencies
In addition to the considerations discussed above, the IRS might be concerned
that the publication of letter rulings issued on fact-specific topics will cause the
public to perceive inconsistencies among the conclusions reached in rulings with
similar but slightly different facts, and this concern might prompt the IRS to refrain
from issuing rulings on such topics entirely. Relatedly, some have expressed the
concern that the use by courts of issued letter rulings to show that the IRS has
engaged in inconsistent interpretations might discourage the IRS from issuing rulings
altogether.327 Whether inconsistency would give rise to a legal remedy is not entirely

324. Goodman, supra note 23, at 88.
325. See Rev. Proc. 2021-1, 2021-1 I.R.B. 1, § 8.06 (“Generally, after the conference of
right is held but before the letter ruling is issued, the branch representative will orally notify
the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative of the Associate office’s conclusions. . . . If the
Associate office is going to rule adversely, the taxpayer will be offered the opportunity to
withdraw the letter ruling request.”); see also Blank, supra note 319, at 457 (“When the IRS
publishes advance tax rulings today, it almost always discloses rulings where the agency
granted taxpayers’ requests. If they anticipate adverse rulings, taxpayers can withdraw their
ruling requests, obviating the need for a written determination by the IRS.”).
326. Blank, supra note 319, at 503 (“[T]he policy should mandate public disclosure of the
outcome of the taxpayer’s request. Possible outcomes are that the IRS grants the request, the
IRS denies the request, or the taxpayer withdraws the request prior to a decision by the IRS.”).
327. E.g., Hoffer, supra note 306, at 348 (“There is a third, closely related argument
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clear.328 However, even absent legal remedy, perceptions of inconsistency could
undermine public trust.
Regarding the potential concern about perceived inconsistency, a couple
responses are in order. First, fact-specific determinations may inevitably result in
somewhat-similar taxpayers being treated differently.329 However, it is not clear
whether perceptions of inconsistency will be exacerbated or mitigated by issuing
rulings. It is at least possible that perceptions of inconsistency will be even greater
absent the issuance of rulings if taxpayers become aware of incomplete and
unsubstantiated information about how other taxpayers were treated on audit.
Professor Johnson, for instance, has noted that the public receives only incomplete
information about inconsistencies in the treatment of taxpayers on audit,330 and
Professor Yin has observed that a lack of transparency about the treatment of
taxpayers could aggravate public perceptions of inconsistent treatment.331

against imposing a broad duty of consistency on the Service. Some opponents of the duty fear
that it will have a chilling effect on the Service’s ruling and information-sharing functions.”);
Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a
Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 599–600 (2010) (“Second, the effect of
a consistency requirement on the IRS’s willingness to provide guidance should be considered.
. . . The number of annual rulings issued by the IRS is already at a low level according to
historical standards. Requiring private letter rulings and other types of guidance to be sources
of required consistency might make them less attractive and exacerbate the situation.”); Gerald
G. Portney, Letter Rulings: An Endangered Species?, 36 TAX L. 751, 751 (1983).
328. For further discussion, see, for example, Hoffer, supra note 306; Johnson, supra note
327; Kwok, supra note 259, at 866 (“Although the extent to which the Service has such a duty
is still ambiguous, case law has raised the possibility that the Service may be bound, under
certain circumstances, to give similar treatment to similarly situated taxpayers.”); Christopher
M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly
Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 531 (2005); Zelenak, supra note 306. One
might argue that the possibility of inconsistency giving rise to a legal remedy is lower in the
case of a fact-specific topic than it might otherwise be; in the case of a fact-specific topic, a
difference in outcome might be explained as not an inconsistency but a difference justified by
different underlying facts. Thus, arguably, the risk to the IRS that a previous letter ruling might
be used against it in the future is lower in the case of a fact-specific topic.
329. For discussion of courts reaching different conclusions regarding whether expenses
are deductible medical expenses in cases with somewhat similar facts, for instance, see supra
notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
330. Johnson, supra note 327, at 568 (“It is impossible to know how often the IRS takes
inconsistent positions. Most transactions between taxpayers and the IRS are subject to privacy
rules and do not become matters of public record.”).
331. George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to
Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1157 (2014) (“Making the decisions in secret does not make
them any less contentious; if anything, it may heighten the degree of controversy. Moreover,
the public may already have knowledge of some of the hard (and debatable) cases because of
disclosures by the organizations affected. Those disclosures, however, may be incomplete so
that the organization can put its position in the best light. Opening up the applications and the
IRS’s decision-making process would tend to ensure greater fairness by the tax agency in
processing the applications and promote fuller communication to help insulate the agency
from unfounded criticism.”).

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 159

2/25/22 10:23 AM

568

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:523

Second, unlike in the case of determinations made on audit that are not publicly
available, in the case of a letter ruling, the IRS can take care to describe the facts of
a ruling in a way that highlights the key facts that led to a different outcome than the
outcome in other rulings. The IRS already maintains an internal system that would
allow it to find any letter rulings on a similar topic.332 Identifying the relevant rulings
would allow the IRS to distinguish the facts of the current ruling from the facts of
other rulings on the same topic. Thus, the IRS can take steps to mitigate any
perceptions of inconsistency in the case of rulings.333
H. Alternatives to Letter Rulings May Be Preferable
One final explanation for the IRS’s reluctance to rule on fact-specific topics may
be that other preferable alternatives exist for providing certainty to taxpayers. One
alternative would entail the IRS issuing generally applicable guidance—like a
revenue ruling—rather than a letter ruling upon which only the particular taxpayer
can rely. Another alternative would entail the taxpayer obtaining a tax opinion from
an advisor, for instance.
As to the first possibility, precisely because of their fact-specific nature, general
guidance is a poor fit for fact-specific topics.334 As to the second possibility, while
the alternative of a tax opinion may offer a convincing justification for refraining
from issuing letter rulings on topics (fact-specific or not) that almost exclusively
affect sophisticated taxpayers who have resources to obtain such advice, it does not
justify a blanket prohibition against ruling on topics that can also affect taxpayers
who are not in that position.335 Of course, requesting a letter ruling also requires
resources, but reduced user fees are charged for taxpayers with incomes below

332. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1058 (1995) (“Letter rulings that are deemed to have
‘reference value,’ as well as supporting documents, are retained in a reference file. When
consideration of a ruling request indicates that a prior letter ruling position should be reversed
or substantially modified, the new ruling may be issued only after a detailed memorandum is
submitted to, and approved by, the Assistant or Associate Chief Counsel.”); Hoffer, supra note
306, at 339 (“[T]he Service maintains prior rulings in a reference file and relies on them when
dealing with similar requests. In addition, when an employee finds that a prior ruling position
should be reversed or modified, the employee may issue a new ruling only with the blessing
of counsel.”); Kwok, supra note 259, at 915 (“The Service maintains an indexed reference file
for PLRs deemed to have ‘significant future reference value because of the issues involved.’
The system is designed to ensure that the Service follows, distinguishes, or renounces its
earlier rulings.”); Zelenak, supra note 306, at 439–43.
333. This is true, assuming that perceptions are inaccurate. If there is true inconsistency,
then continuing to issue published rulings could help to serve the function of discouraging
inconsistency.
334. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. One possible response is that the IRS
ought to focus its letter ruling efforts on non-fact-specific topics because requests on those
topics could provide the IRS with information that it could use to select topics on which
general guidance could be useful. However, there are other means by which the IRS can obtain
information about topics in which guidance would be useful, such as through seeking
comments on its priority guidance plan.
335. See supra note 15.
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certain thresholds,336 and it may be possible to simplify the process for requesting
rulings on some topics affecting individual taxpayers.
CONCLUSION
Tax law contains many standard-based tests that require fact-specific analysis to
determine the appropriate tax outcome. It is, in part, because of those standard-based
aspects of tax law that taxpayers will often have questions about the tax treatment of
their transactions, but those are precisely the types of questions on which the IRS
will not issue letter rulings. Eight possible rationales might, at first, appear to explain
the IRS’s reluctance to rule on fact-specific topics. However, a closer examination
of each potential rationale shows that the rationales do not justify a blanket policy
against ruling on fact-specific topics because each rationale could be equally well
addressed or better addressed by taking steps other than simply not issuing rulings.
Moreover, taking steps other than simply not issuing rulings to address the concerns
undergirding the IRS’s reluctance to rule on fact-specific questions would allow the
IRS to issue letter rulings on questions for which a letter ruling could be particularly
useful.

336. In addition, the fee schedules could be modified to include additional levels based on
other ranges of income, as discussed above. See supra notes 272–275 and accompanying text.
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